The US Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 15

Intelligence
Throughout the offensive planning period, US intelligence speculated
about the Soviet threat. Some concern was expressed about an overt at-
tack, but the main BW threat to the US was seen as sabotage, since the
Soviet bombing range in the late 1940s was limited. 30
On 5 October 1948, the Committee on Biological Warfare reported
on the covert BW threat. Sounding an alarm that was to reverberate
throughout the Cold War and into the “war on terror,” it stressed that
“the United States is particularly vulnerable to this type of attack.” Small
amounts of biological agents could be used to kill or incapacitate “a sig-
nificant portion of the human population within selected target areas.”
The food supply of a nation could be directly attacked. “Stamps, enve-
lopes, money and cosmetics” might be used to disseminate biological
agents. Ventilating systems and water supplies could be contaminated. 31
The USSR was cited as the nation most capable of using BW against
the US. But would it? The intelligence estimates were always carefully
hedged. 32
What then did the US really know about the supporting Soviet infra-
structure for the launching of BW? Two months after the end of World
War II, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had drawn up a list of
twenty potential targets in the USSR, citing cities that contained “facili-
ties for scientific research and development.” The JIC admitted that its in-
telligence was limited regarding “the locations and functions of the lead-
ing scientific research and development laboratories.” Gorki, Kuibyshev,
Sverdlovsk, and Kazan were identified as engaged in bacteriological re-
search. Moscow and Leningrad were listed as “primary centers for scien-
tific research and development” though not specifically tied to BW. 33
If the USSR was pursuing an active BW program, what agents was it
cultivating? Citing German and Japanese sources, the Joint Intelligence
Staff (JIS) named “cholera, dysentery and anthrax” but then confessed
that it had no further “factual information.” The degree of ignorance re-
garding Soviet capabilities is revealed by the report's final speculations:
“With intensive effort, the USSR should be capable of being one of the
most advanced nations of the world in the field of BW. It is believed that
the USSR would require only a few years preparation (no more than five)