The US Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 16

to wage open large-scale biological warfare, and it is conceivable that the
USSR may be prepared to do so at the present time.” 34 Some of the capa-
bilities assigned to Soviet subversive BW strained credulity. 35
The outbreak of the Korean War heightened American anxieties. A
1951 CIA estimate opined: “At present, the Soviets are capable of produc-
ing a variety of agents in sufficient quantities for sabotage or small-scale
employment. By 1952 at the latest, the Soviets probably will be capable
of mass production of BW agents for large-scale employment. The Sovi-
ets would most likely develop and produce for employment against the
United States one or more of the BW agents listed in A.” Appendix A
consisted of a list of antipersonnel, antianimal, and anticrop agents with
their attendant diseases in what may well be a classic example of mirror
imaging. 36
Another 1951 estimate described Soviet BW sabotage operations in
terms that eerily foreshadow the current fears of terrorist operations: that
saboteurs would enter undetected through the porous borders of the US
and would establish sleeper cells, eluding detection until they were pre-
pared to strike at personnel, animals, or crops. 37
By the end of the Eisenhower administration, more attention was fo-
cused on the danger of large-scale open attacks on the US. In a 1960 re-
port the CIA estimated that the advantages of a Soviet clandestine BW at-
tack would diminish as the USSR developed its intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) capability. The Soviets would be more likely to use BW
“as a subsidiary operation in conjunction with a deliberate Soviet initi-
ation of general war.” 38 Heightening the anxiety of American policy-
makers was the belief that the USSR had a vastly superior stockpile of
CBW. As Dr. York stated at the 435th meeting of the NSC, the US stock-
pile was “one-fourth that of the USSR.” 39
From 1960 on, the ICBM revolution had a profound effect on evalua-
tions of how the danger might come. Increasing attention was paid to So-
viet ICBM capability. Now nuclear weapons trumped CBW, rendering
them redundant for purposes of strategic attack. 40 Uncertainty predomi-
nated. Lack of firm intelligence reinforced the belief that the USSR was
better prepared than the US and that the ruthless Soviets, if it were to
their advantage, would use CBW in war. During the Kennedy-Johnson
era, bafflement still prevailed. For the JCS, determining enemy inten-
tions was shaped by available Soviet doctrinal literature. In a general war,