The US Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 14

to persuade the public and Congress of the humanity of CBW, few were
convinced. The later use of nonlethal agents in Vietnam intensified oppo-
sition to the distinction strategy. 21 Kennedy's CBW policy largely resem-
bled Eisenhower's, 22 although there was also a move to abolish BW. 23
In 1961 a proposal, “Joint Declaration on Disarmament,” met with op-
position from the military chiefs, who were not comfortable with the pro-
visions dealing with the elimination of CBR weapons. The JCS argued
that “the US is, and should remain, free to use nuclear weapons if placed
in a position of individual or collective self-defense. The proposal should
not be made even for CBR weapons because it would open the door to
inclusion of all 'weapons of mass destruction' including nuclear weap-
ons.” 24 On 11 August 1961 the revised “Joint Declaration of Disarma-
ment” was released “for approval by the General Assembly of the United
Nations.” 25
Another initiative during the Kennedy administration was a proposal
to pursue BW disarmament separately from general disarmament. In
1963 Secretary of State Dean Rusk pushed a program to ban BW. The
logic for such an unconditional ban was based partly on the lag in BW
preparedness. 26 William C. Foster, director of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency (ACDA), wanted to study the proposal. McGeorge
Bundy, the president's special assistant, agreed that an ACDA study reas-
sessing the utility of CBW should precede any action. 27
Despite its pursuit of disarmament, the Kennedy administration imple-
mented a policy that complicated later attempts to abolish CBW: the use
of herbicides and riot-control agents in Vietnam. On 30 November 1961,
President Kennedy approved the use of herbicides in operations against
the Vietcong. While food crops were sprayed by South Vietnamese units,
defoliants were used by American air units to destroy Vietcong food sup-
plies and expose key enemy routes. This program was begun with the
realization that it could provoke serious protests. 28 Riot-control agents,
deemed nonlethal, were used for various tactical situations, including the
flushing out of enemy troops from caves and fortifications.
The protests were not long in coming. The Kennedy and later the
Johnson administrations constantly argued that because they were not
using lethal agents or poisons, they were not violating international law
or the Geneva Protocol. 29