The Iraqi Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 186

when sanctions were lifted. The ISG reported that “depending on its
scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a
few weeks to a few months of a decision to do so, but ISG discovered no
indications that the regime was pursuing such a course.” 12 In seeking to
explain why Iraq continued to provide a confused message regarding its
WMD capabilities, the ISG presented the following conclusion:
From the evidence available through the actions and statements of a
range of Iraqis, it seems clear that the guiding theme for WMD was
to sustain the intellectual capacity achieved over so many years at such
a great cost and to be in a position to produce again with as short a
lead time as possible—within the vital constraint that no action should
threaten the prime objective of ending international sanctions and con-
straints. Saddam continued to see the utility of WMD. He explained that
he purposely gave an ambiguous impression about possession as a deter-
rent to Iran. He gave explicit direction to maintain the intellectual capa-
bilities. As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of
activities that could support full WMD reactivation. He directed that bal-
listic missile work continue that would support long-range missile devel-
opment. Virtually no senior Iraqi believed that Saddam had forsaken
WMD forever. Evidence suggests that, as resources became available and
the constraints of sanctions decayed, there was a direct expansion of
activity that would have the effect of supporting future WMD reconsti-
tution. 13
Despite all these indications of long-term intentions to maintain the ca-
pability to restart a BW program, it seems clear that in reality, after the
mid-1990s Iraq had neither stockpiles of BW nor an ongoing program to
directly develop BW. As the ISG “Comprehensive Report” put it, “with
the destruction of the Al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambitions to
obtain advanced BW weapons quickly. ISG found no direct evidence that
Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW program or was conducting BW-
specific work for military purposes. Indeed, from the mid-1990s, despite
evidence of continuing interest in nuclear and chemical weapons, there
appears to be a complete absence of discussion or even interest in BW at
the Presidential level.” 14
In July 2004 reports were issued in both the US and the UK evaluat-
ing the intelligence regarding Iraq's WMD. 15 The US Senate report made