The Iraqi Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 187

it clear that the major judgments in the intelligence community's Octo-
ber 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, “Iraq's Continuing Programs for
Weapons of Mass Destruction,” were at best overstated:

particularly that Iraq “has chemical and biological weapons,” was devel-
oping an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) “probably intended to deliver
biological warfare agents,” and that “all key aspects—research and de-
velopment (R&D), production and weaponization—of Iraq's offensive
biological weapons (BW) program are active and that most elements are
larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War,” either
overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence report-
ing provided to the Committee. 16

The UK drew similar conclusions, though in different ways. It pru-
dently pointed out that “the most important limitation on intelligence is
its incompleteness ...Infact, it is often, when first acquired, sporadic and
patchy, and even after analysis may still be at best inferential.” 17 It also

observed that

assessments in the chemical and biological weapons fields are intrinsi-
cally more difficult, and that analysis draws on different intelligence
techniques. We are conscious in particular that, because chemical and
biological weapons programmes can draw heavily on “dual use” materi-
als, it is easier for a proliferating state to keep its programmes covert . . .
Our impression is that they [Joint Intelligence Committee assessments]
were less complete . . . and hence inclined towards over-cautious or
worst case estimates, carrying with them a greater sense of suspicion and
an accompanying propensity to disbelieve. 18

The UK report concludes:

Even now it would be premature to reach conclusions about Iraq's pro-
hibited weapons. Much potential evidence may have been destroyed in
the looting and disorder that followed the cessation of hostilities. Other
material may be hidden in the sand, including stocks of agent and weap-
ons. We believe that it would be a rash person who asserted at this stage
that evidence of Iraqi possession of biological or chemical agents, or even
of banned missiles, does not exist or will never be found. But as a result
of our Review, and taking into account the evidence that has been found