The Iraqi Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 185

lated to this endeavour. The Governing Council is engaged in ensuring
respect for all international treaties and conventions signed by Iraq and
as soon as circumstances allow the Council will seriously consider fur-
ther development of national legislation to prohibit all forms of produc-
tion of weapons of mass destruction. 9
Further insight became available in early 2004 through published in-
terviews with David Kay, 10 the initial leader of the ISG, and a statement
by Charles Duelfer, who replaced Kay as leader of the ISG; and in Sep-
tember 2004 with the release of the ISG's “Comprehensive Report.” The
interviews with Kay indicated that the ISG had gained greater insight into
Iraqi perceptions of the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC inspections and the de-
ception and denial program carried out by Iraq. It is becoming clearer that
Iraqi officials feared the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC inspections because of
their effectiveness, despite the Iraqi attempts to deceive the inspectors
and deny them information. Furthermore, it is becoming clear that Iraq
destroyed most of its stockpiles in the summer of 1991. What is not yet
clear is whether Iraq sought to retain the capability to produce CBW. The
recent interviews convey the impression that senior Iraqi personnel be-
lieved that the CBW programs could be restarted quickly. According to
Charles Duelfer in his March 2004 statement to the US Congress, the ISG
found that the Iraqi deception efforts continued until the onset of mili-
tary operations in March 2003. Duelfer also said that the ISG had devel-
oped new information regarding Iraq's dual-use facilities and ongoing
work suitable for a capability to produce biological or chemical agents on
short notice.
It is, however, far from clear why, if Iraq had indeed destroyed all
stockpiles of CBW in 1991, it chose to hinder the work of UNSCOM and
UNMOVIC and thus prolong the maintenance of sanctions. David Kay,
on the assumption that Saddam Hussein's main fear was of a coup d'état
or a revolution, believes that CBW were regarded principally as instru-
ments for domestic use. Hans Blix speculates that Iraq did not mind the
promulgation of a deliberate ambiguity, and that the issue involved na-
tional pride. 11
In September 2004 the ISG said that Saddam Hussein so dominated the
Iraqi regime that its strategic intent was his alone and that he wanted to
end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his WMD