Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
Specifically, this challenge boils down to the question of how a small nuclear
force may be preserved inviolate so that, even if first strikes are unleashed
in
extremis,
a substantial fraction of the nuclear assets will survive, ready to be
reconstituted for the devastating retribution to follow. In general, states that
already possess nuclear arsenals have adopted some combination of the
following basic solutions designed to ensure survivability: 'physical hardening,
geographic dispersion, mobility, redundancy, secrecy, and the active interdiction
of attacking weapons',
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each of which embodies different benefits and costs.
Since India has eschewed the development of a robust and ready arsenal in
favor of a force-in-being, it is unlikely to pursue either physical hardening or
active interdiction of attacking weapons as the
primary
means of ensuring
survivability. It is likely to focus instead on configuring its force-in-being in such
a way so as to feature
pervasively distributed
capabilities in order that no
completed strategic systems actually exist
routinely as transparent targets for
potential interdiction
. This orientation, exploiting concealment, deception, and
mobility, will be defined around distributed capabilities and it is this feature
which not only makes the Indian deterrent a force-in-being as opposed to, say, a
robust and ready arsenal but also broadly contributes to resolving its problems of
survivability—at least in principle.
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The concept of distributed capabilities implies that the normal peacetime
posture of India's nuclear deterrent will consist of deliberately separated
components maintained under conditions of great secrecy. For purposes of
analysis, these components may be treated as encompassing: the weapon's core
which consists of some kind of fissile material and is usually referred to as the 'pit';
the weapon assembly which consists of all the other non-nuclear elements of the
device, including the safing, arming, fuzing and firing (SAFF) subsystems; and
the delivery platform, whether that be an aircraft or a missile. If the delivery
platform is a missile, there are strictly speaking two components, the missile
itself and the launch system: the technical characteristics of the latter will vary
depending on whether the missile is designed for road- or rail-mobility, or if it is
intended for basing on a sea-based surface or sub-surface platform.
Although the exact extent of separation that will be operationalized in practice
is unknown and will never be revealed by India's security managers, it is
possible to identify abstractly at least six relatively distinct degrees of separation
that could define the routine configuration of India's nuclear deterrent, on the
assumption that this force will eventually include only gravity bombs and
warheads to be carried either by land-based aircraft or land- and sea-based
ballistic missiles. If the inventory were to include cruise missiles of different
sorts and various kinds of tactical nuclear weapons, the postures described below
would have to be further modified, but since it is likely that India's nuclear
systems in the foreseeable future will consist mainly of land and sea-based
ballistic missiles—the Agni and, possibly, the Prithvi, in several variants—and
