Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
concluded, would compel them either to terminate the production of weapon-
usable materials or at least transparently account for all their future inventories.
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This fact, coupled with the constraints imposed by the parlous state of India's
nuclear infrastructure, sets a ceiling on the size of India's future nuclear arsenal
which cannot be negotiated away unless the country is willing to make a massive
investment in new nuclear production facilities right away in the hope that it can
dramatically distend its potential arsenal before the decade is out (which is when
the constraints emerging from a FMCT could conceivably kick in).
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K.Subrahmanyam, in recent writings, has sought to clarify what the outer
limits of the Indian minimum deterrent might be by affirming that the country's
emerging arsenal will probably be pegged eventually at about a 150 nuclear
weapons
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—a judgment obviously based on the premise that no FMCT
restrictions will be operational for at least another decade
and
that India can
improve the efficiency of its plutonium production for weapons purposes in the
interim.
All this implies that the emerging Indian nuclear deterrent eventually will be
quite limited in size: it will be a relatively small force consisting of about 150
weapons (and possibly even fewer) by the year 2010, most of which likely will
be capable of producing only comparatively small yields of about 20 kt (if New
Delhi persists with its current moratorium on nuclear testing). India will continue
to pursue a variety of delivery systems, especially ballistic and cruise missiles,
and will acquire as many of these systems as is necessary to deliver its nuclear
weapons under a wide variety of operational contingencies.
Because none of the missiles currently existing are ideal vehicles for nuclear
payloads, however, it is likely that India will continue to develop these systems
to reach ranges that will probably not exceed 3,500 km. This may be so, even as
it persists in experimenting with a variety of unorthodox basing modes in order
to migrate gradually from the current reliance on air-breathing vehicles that will
nonetheless remain the primary carriers of India's nuclear weaponry for at least
some years to come.
Separated in Disposition
Although the mature Indian arsenal will remain a relatively small force, the very
fact of its existence will become a source of threat to India's adversaries, both
China and Pakistan, who in the event of deterrence breakdown may be forced to
contemplate a variety of preemptive damage limiting strategies purely for
defensive reasons.
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An important challenge facing India's evolving arsenal,
therefore, consists of ensuring its survivability against any first-strike
temptations on the part of an adversary, and neutralizing such temptations
successfully represents the first key to successful deterrence.
