Toward a ‘Force-in-Being’: The Logic, Structure, and Utility of India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture - India as an Emerging Power - page 60

detail the anatomy of the force-in-being itself. The third and final section
explores the kind of nuclear posture that might replace the force-in-being after it
has outlived its current utility as an instrument for safeguarding Indian security.
THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE 'FORCE-IN-BEING'
A synoptic comparison of the three alternatives defining nuclearization in the
aftermath of the May 1998 tests should indicate why the traditional Indian
posture of 'maintaining the option'—Alternative III described earlier—cannot be
a destination that New Delhi will return to in its search for a credible deterrent. This
alternative, by eschewing the development of an arsenal of any sort, simply
nullifies the Government of India's decision to create a strategic force and,
consequently, has not been pursued. Alternative IV—the 'recessed deterrent'—
has been rejected as well, since its emphasis on readying supporting capabilities
rather than nuclear weapons and delivery systems prevents the development of
those critical components required by a minimum deterrent.
Alternative V, in contrast—a 'robust and ready arsenal'—clearly enables New
Delhi to pursue a 'minimum credible (nuclear) deterrent' but, by being too
expensive, likely violating its desire for strict civilian control, and possibly being
subversive of crisis stability, represents a posture that is much too extravagant
for India's deterrence needs.
The decision to acquire a nuclear deterrent configured as a force-in-being,
rather than the robust and ready arsenal advocated by many Indian hawks, then
represents a compromise choice on the part of Indian policymakers that seeks to
service many external demands and internal constraints simultaneously. It
provides India with strategic advantages insofar as the presence of nuclear
weapons in some form suffices to prevent blatant blackmail by China and
Pakistan. It bequeaths New Delhi with diplomatic benefits by exemplifying
'restraint', particularly in comparison with an overt arsenal, and—in so doing—
holds the promise of attenuating US nonproliferation pressures on India.
It offers psycho-political reassurance insofar as it bolsters the confidence of
India's national leadership, enhances its resolve in crises with local adversaries,
and simultaneously provides the country with status as a nuclear weapons power.
It buttresses existing domestic political structures by enabling India's civilian
security managers to institutionally exclude the military from the day-to-day
control and custody over the most critical components of India's strategic
capability. And, finally, it portends budgetary relief insofar as its relatively
quiescent force posture avoids all the high costs usually associated with the
procurement, deployment, and operation of a ready arsenal.
The key idea encompassed by the notion of a force-in-being is that the entire
'arsenal' functions as a strategic reserve —neither fully visible nor operationally
alerted—yet nonetheless present and available for employment—after some