Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
preparation—when strategic necessity dictates. The weapons and delivery
systems
are
developed and produced, with key sub-components maintained under
civilian custody, but these assets are sequestered and covertly maintained in
distributed form, with different custodians exercising strict stewardship over the
components entrusted to them for safekeeping.
The quiescence of the force-in-being at the operational level does not
translate, however, into inactivity at the level of strategy. A force-in-being is
indeed very active at the grand strategic levels of diplomacy and political choice,
but this activity is manifested not so much by its tempo as by its effects. Its very
existence as a potentially complete—but dormant—capability serves as a
deterrent to possible adventurism by an adversary: it constantly hovers in the
adversary's consciousness, commands its attention, keeps it at bay, and prevents
it from attempting anything that would result in risk and hazard to itself, while
constantly obliging it to think of nothing but being on guard against the terrible
attack that would follow in retaliation against any of its provocations.
8
Not surprisingly, a deterrence posture modeled on the notion of a force-in-
being also functioned as the template governing the disposition of other Indian
strategic assets. For example, New Delhi pursued a large chemical weapons
research, development and production program covertly for almost two decades
prior to the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which
banned all such weapons universally. The Indian government consistently denied
the existence of a chemical weapons program in the early years of the
negotiations leading up to the CWC,
9
and even the Indian military was largely in
the dark about the character and the extent of these weapons, which were
maintained completely under the control of the civilian Ministry of Defence.
Another example relevant to this discussion concerns India's short-range
ballistic missiles (SRBM), notably the land-based versions of the Prithvi, which
are intended as conventional deep attack systems that will eventually be
available in three different range variants with five alternative types of
conventional warheads.
10
Fears about the system's nuclear potential raised by
both Pakistan and the United States have resulted in India treating the Prithvi
force as if it were a strategic asset held in inert reserve. The Indian Army's
missile inventory is not maintained by its controlling units in their designated
area of operation. Instead, the unit slated to operate the missiles, the 333rd
Missile Group, is based in Secunderabad in South India, while the missiles
themselves are secured in storage bunkers—unfuelled—close to the Indo-
Pakistan border.
11
Both the chemical weapons program and the Prithvi SRBM force highlight
two separate but related characteristics of the future Indian nuclear force-in-
being. The former example suggests that the nuclear arsenal will be highly
opaque, with great deception, denial, concealment, and mobility, utilized to hide
the location of critical assets like weapons, delivery systems, assembly sites, and
