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few months, ought to suffice for Indian security, especially if New Delhi can
utilize the threat to overtly deploy nuclear weapons as leverage both to accelerate
the pace of global nuclear arms reductions and to secure preferential economic
and political gains for India. 6
The latter, in contrast, argue simply that India has already crossed the Rubicon
by resuming nuclear testing and, consequently, should not halt its nuclearization
until it acquires a large, diverse, and ready nuclear arsenal that will bequeath
New Delhi both security and status. 7 By all indications, and in contrast to the
views held by many within and outside India, the Indian government currently
has chosen to split the difference between the positions advocated by the
proponents of alternatives (4) and (5) (see Figure 1 ). The Indian nuclear force
FIGURE 1 INDIA'S FORCE-IN-BEING IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS STRATEGIC
ALTERNATIVES
will be configured neither as a recessed deterrent nor as a ready arsenal but as a
force-in-being, that is, a deterrent consisting of available, but dispersed,
components that are capable of being constituted into usable weapon systems
during a supreme emergency.
This article seeks to explicate the logic, structure and utility of this distinctive
nuclear force posture. Toward that end, it is divided into three sections. The first
section describes why the solution represented by the force-in-being today
appears attractive to Indian policymakers in the context of other past efforts to
operationalize similar strategic regimes. The second section describes in some
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