Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
83.
This fact is corroborated at various points in Perkovich,
India's Nuclear Bomb
(note 3) and in Chengappa,
Weapons of Peace
(note 65). The capability of the Prime
Minister to control the entire defense establishment, both institutionally and
operationally, is emphasized in Veena Kukreja,
Civil-Military Relations in South
Asia
(New Delhi: Sage Publications 1991) pp.185-228.
84.
On the logic and practice of 'pre-delegation' during the Cold War, see Peter
D.Feaver,
Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the
United States
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1992) pp.44-54. It is important to
recognize the distinction between 'devolution' and 'pre-delegation' of command
authority: The former refers to the 'orderly transfer of the entire command
function, along with a preset chain of command, when the superior in the hierarchy
is incapacitated' while the latter refers to the 'a priori delimitation of circumstances
under which subordinates in the chain of command can assume that the
authorization to use nuclear weapons has been given to them'. Feaver, ibid. p.44.
85.
At least one serious Indian analyst has made a systematic argument for what
appears to be a partially delegative command system with the uniformed services
possessing custody of completed nuclear weapons in peacetime. Whether such a
demand for custody is complemented by a demand for pre-delegated use authority
is less clear, but it may be implied by the requirement for a launch-on-warning
capability discussed in Menon,
A
Nuclear Strategy for India
(note 7) pp.177-282.
86.
'India and the Nuclear Question: An Interview with General K.Sundarji, PVSM
(Retd)',
Trishul
7/2 (1994) pp.45-56.
87.
This concept is discussed systematically in John D.Steinbruner, 'Nuclear
Decapitation',
Foreign Policy
45 (Winter 1981/82) pp.16-28.
88.
'Draft Report of [the] National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear
Doctrine', p.3.
89.
Gregory F.Giles and James E.Doyle, 'Indian and Pakistani Views on Nuclear
Deterrence',
Comparative Strategy
15/2 (1996) p.154.
90.
The elements of this framework can be found in the many writings of K.Sundarji,
with quick summaries available in 'India and the Nuclear Question: An Interview
with General K.Sundarji, PVSM (Retd)' pp.45-56; Sundarji, 'Prithvi in the
Haystack'; Sundarji, 'Nuclear Deterrence: Doctrine for India-I and II'. On
Sundarji's contributions as constituting the baseline for India's command system
and deterrence doctrines, see C.Raja Mohan, 'Sundarji's nuclear doctrine',
The
Hindu,
11 Feb. 1999, and Subrahmanyam, 'Indian Nuclear Policy—1964-98', in
Singh,
Nuclear India
(note 6) pp.38-50.
91.
This is alluded to in 'India Not to Engage in a N-Arms Race: Jaswant'.
92.
Empirical examples of how this process has been institutionalized historically can
be found in various passages throughout Perkovich,
India's Nuclear Bomb
(note 3)
and in Chengappa,
Weapons of Peace
(note 65).
93.
For a brief, perhaps all too impressionistic, description of how this was attempted
during the Kargil crisis, see Chengappa,
Weapons of Peace
(note 65) pp.437-8.
94.
Since India's traditional delivery systems were exclusively aircraft, the Chief of
Air Staff remained the only service chief with responsibilities to the nuclear
command system. As India's delivery systems grow in diversity to include Army
and Navy assets, it is likely that the Chiefs of Army and Navy staffs will also be
included in parallel arrangements, if the 'baseline' model of assertive command
survives more or less unaltered over time.
