Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
event and not because they are entitled to know merely because of the position they
held within the Indian state. See Chengappa,
Weapons of Peace
(note 65) p.114.
69.
P.R.Chari,
Protection of Fissile Materials: The Indian Experience,
ACDIS
Occasional Paper (Urbana: University of Illinois, Sept. 1998) p.57.
70.
Menon,
A Nuclear Strategy for India
(note 7) pp.235-61.
71.
K.Sundarji, 'Indian Nuclear Doctrine -I: Notions of deterrence'.
72.
Subrahmanyam, 'Nuclear Force Design and Minimum Deterrence Strategy for
India', in Karnad,
Future Imperiled
(note 42) pp.186-91. On this issue, see also
Agha Shahi
et al.,
'Securing Nuclear Peace',
The News International,
5 Oct. 1999,
and Robert A.Manning
et al.,
China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control
(New
York: Council on Foreign Relations 2000).
73.
Subrahmanyam, 'Nuclear Force Design and Minimum Deterrence Strategy for
India', in Karnad,
Future Imperiled
(note 42) pp.176-95.
74.
Peter D.Feaver, 'Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations',
International
Security
17/3 (Winter 1992/93) p.163.
75.
Ibid.
76.
Ibid. p.168.
77.
For more of these innovations, and their limitations, see Scott D.Sagan,
The Limits
of
Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons
(Princeton University
Press 1993). See also, MSgt. William A.Hodgson, 'Nuclear Weapons Personnel
Reliability Program',
Combat Edge
4/1 (June 1995) pp.22-3.
78.
The term comes from Feaver, 'Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear
Nations' (note 74) p.170.
79.
In fact, it is very likely that, after accounting for all their relevant differences, the
Indian command system is more likely to resemble the Soviet command system
during the Cold War rather than the American at least insofar as the latter's
obsession with system survivability and adequacy of target coverage will be
replaced, as in the Soviet model, by equal if not greater emphasis on 'geopolitical
considerations, self-preservation, and negative control as [it does on] damage
expectancy'. Bruce C.Blair,
The Logic of
Accidental Nuclear War
(Washington DC:
Brookings 1993) p.59. The Soviet command system and its contrasting biases are
reviewed in some detail in this work, pp.59-167.
80.
Some Indian scholars have argued for a formalization of this process through the
institutionalization of something akin to a 'two-man' rule (see, 'India: Study
Recommends Two-Person Rule for Using Nuclear Arms',
FBIS-TAC-98-261
, 18
Sept. 1998), but Indian policymakers, while not ruling out such solutions
eventually, do emphasize in private that their current arrangements in fact afford
far greater protection than would be offered by a two-man rule, since the necessity
for collaboration between at least two organizations to ready India's nuclear
weapons itself ensures that more than two individuals would be required to prepare
these weapons for delivery. The description at various points in Chengappa,
Weapons of Peace
(note 65) clearly corroborates this claim.
81.
This concept, though not this term, is discussed at length in Scott Sagan, 'The
Origins of Military Doctrine and Command Systems', in Peter R.Lavoy, Scott
D.Sagan, and James J.Wirtz (eds.),
Planning the Unthinkable
(Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, Aug. 2000).
82.
The term comes from Feaver, 'Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear
Nations' (note 74) p.170.
