Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
54.
For more on the terrible state of India's nuclear infrastructure, see Nayan Chanda,
'The Perils of Power',
Far Eastern Economic Review,
4 Feb. 1999, pp.10-17. The
terrible disrepair in both civilian and weapon programs has been further described
in T.S.Gopi Rethinaraj, 'In the Comfort of Secrecy',
The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists
55/6 (Nov. 1999) pp.52-7.
55.
K.Subrahmanyam, 'A Credible Deterrent: Logic of The Nuclear Doctrine',
The
Times of
India,
4 Oct. 1999.
56.
Gregory S.Jones,
From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces: The Hard Choices
Facing
India and Pakistan,
IP-192 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2000).
57.
Steinbruner, 'Choices and Trade-offs', in Ashton B.Carter
et al.
(eds.),
Managing
Nuclear
Operations
(Washington DC: Brookings 1987) p.546.
58.
Bajpai, 'India's Diplomacy and Defence after Pokhran II', in
Post Pokhran II: The
National Way Ahead,
pp.39-45.
59.
See 'Draft Report of [the] National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear
Doctrine', p.23; 'India Not to Engage in a N-Arms Race' (note 32).
60.
'Draft Report of [the] National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear
Doctrine', p.3.
61.
Ibid.
62.
For more on these technologies, see United States Congress, House Committee on
Armed Services, Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety,
Nuclear Weapons Safety:
Report of the Panel
on Nuclear Weapons Safety of the Committee on Armed
Services,
House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session
(Washington DC: USGPO 1990); Donald Cotter, 'Peacetime Operations: Safety
and Security', in Carter,
Managing
Nuclear Operations
(note 57) pp.17-74.
63.
For more on such designs, see Chuck Hansen (ed.),
The Swords of Armageddon,
Vol.VIII (Sunnyvale, USA: Chukelea Publications 1995) VIII-11-36.
64.
See the discussion at various points in Chengappa,
Weapons of Peace
(note 65),
and Perkovich,
India's Nuclear Bomb
(note 3).
65.
Raj Chengappa,
Weapons of Peace
(New Delhi: HarperCollins 2000) pp.xv-xvi.
66.
See Subrahmanyam, 'Indian Nuclear Policy—1964-98', in Singh,
Nuclear India
(note 6) pp.26-53 and episodically throughout Perkovich,
India's Nuclear Bomb
(note 3) and Chengappa,
Weapons of Peace
(note 65).
67.
The failure to distinguish between informal networks and formal institutions as far
as decision-making with respect to the Indian nuclear weapons program is
concerned often leaves many Western and even Indian analysts puzzled and
confused. See, for example, Jonathan Karp, 'India Faces Task of Creating Nuclear-
Weapons Doctrine',
The Wall Street
Journal,
27 May 1998. By looking hard for
formal institutions and not finding them, they are often led to the erroneous
conclusion that an effective Indian nuclear command system does not currently
exist. For good theoretical work that highlights the distinction between institutions
and networks, see Manuel Castells,
The Informational City: Information
Technology, Economic Restructuring, and the Urban-Regional Process
(Cambridge: Blackwell 1989).
68.
Chengappa, for example, points out how even India's Defence Ministers, its service
chiefs, and important senior bureaucrats, historically often knew what they did
about India's nuclear weapons program and activities only because they were
specifically told what they needed to know in the context of some incipient nodal
