Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
to upwards of 800 20 kt sized weapons. See, G.Balachandran, 'Nuclear
Weaponization in India',
Agni
5/1 (Jan.-April 2000) pp.42-7.
38.
K.Sundarji, 'Nuclear Deterrence: Doctrine for India-I',
Trishul
5/2 (Dec. 1992) p.
48. In later writings, Sundarji reduced these requirements even further arguing that
'all that is needed to deter a small to medium sized country would be about 20
weapons of about 20 kiloton yield each [.4 MTE], and about 50 such weapons [1
MTE] for even a large country'. See K. Sundarji, 'The CTBT Debate: Choice
before India',
The Indian Express,
4 Dec. 1995.
39.
K.Sundarji, 'CTBT and National Security: Options for India',
The Indian Express,
6 April 1996.
40.
Sundarji, 'Imperatives of Indian Minimum Nuclear Deterrence',
Agni
2/1 (May
1996) p.18.
41.
Ibid.
42.
Subrahmanyam, 'Nuclear Force Design and Minimum Deterrence Strategy for
India', in Bharat Karnad (ed.),
Future Imperiled
(Delhi: Viking 1994) p.189.
43.
Raj Chengappa and Manoj Joshi, 'Future Fire',
India Today,
25 May 1998, p.23.
44.
Karnad, 'A Thermonuclear Deterrent', in Mattoo,
India's Nuclear Deterrent
(note
5) p.143.
45.
Subrahmanyam, 'Nuclear Force Design and Minimum Deterrence Strategy for
India', in Karnad,
Future Imperiled
(note 42) p.193.
46.
Manoj Joshi, 'Marginal Costing',
India Today,
1 June 1998, pp.22-3.
47.
Nair,
Nuclear India
(note 7) pp.171-2.
48.
Karnad, 'A Thermonuclear Deterrent', in Mattoo,
India's Nuclear Deterrent
(note
5) p.146.
49.
For still another set of desired numbers pertaining to delivery systems, see Gurmeet
Kanwal, 'India's Nuclear Force Structure',
Strategic Analysis
24/6 (Sept. 2000) pp.
1039-75.
50.
The entire nuclear infrastructure is detailed in Perkovich,
India's Nuclear Bomb
(note 3) pp.469-72, and the portions relevant to the nuclear weapons production
program are briefly described in Manoj Joshi, 'India's Nuclear Estate',
India Today
International,
4 May 1998.
51.
'Draft Report of [the] National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear
Doctrine',
India News,
1 Oct. 1999, p.2.
52.
This has also been affirmed by Indian security managers like Jaswant Singh who
note that 'this “minimum”…cannot be a fixed physical quantification'. See 'India
Not to Engage in a N-Arms Race: Jaswant'. See also Prime Minister Vajpayee's
statement in 'Deterrence to Be Evaluated Time to Time: Govt',
Economic Times,
17 Dec. 1998.
53.
As Jaswant Singh phrased it, 'We have, after the tests last year, announced our
readiness to engage in multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva for a non-discriminatory and verifiable treaty to ban future production of
fissile materials for nuclear weapon purposes.
This decision was taken after due
consideration, which included an
assessment of timeframes for negotiations and
entry into force of an FMCT.
At this stage, India cannot accept a voluntary
moratorium on production of fissile materials. Let me add that FMCT negotiations
are a complex exercise; it will be important, therefore, as we go along to constantly
monitor the pace, direction and content of these negotiations' (italics added). See
'India Not to Engage in a N-Arms Race' (note 32).
