Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
95.
This term, obviously, is used in a very different sense from that appearing in Paul
Bracken,
The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces
(New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press 1983).
96.
A good analysis of how intelligent, informal and non-planned, interventions play a
critical role in ensuring the effectiveness of even large, formal, military decision
systems can be found in N.F.Kristy,
Man in a Large Information Processing System
—His Changing Role
in SAGE,
RM-3206-PR (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1963).
97.
See, for example, Clayton P.Bowen and Daniel Wolven, 'Command and Control
Challenges in South Asia',
The Nonproliferation Review
6/3 (Spring-Summer 1999)
p.25, and Ashok K.Mehta, 'Need to involve services in decision-making stressed',
India
Abroad,
12 March 1999.
98.
The distinctiveness of formal organizations, in contrast to the alternatives, is
explored in some detail in Michael I.Reed,
The Sociology of Organizations:
Themes, Perspectives, and
Prospects
(New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1992).
99.
P.R.Chari,
Command and Control Arrangements,
Report of the sixth IPCS Seminar
on the Implications of Nuclear Testing in South Asia, available at www.ipcs.org/
issues/articles/ 135-ndi-chari.html.
100.
Manvendra Singh, 'Who Should Control Nuclear Button? Armed Forces Have a
Proposal',
The Indian Express,
1 Sept. 1998; Rahul Bedi, 'India Assesses Options
on Future Nuclear Control',
Jane's Defence Weekly,
16 Sept. 1998, p.16.
101.
Bedi, 'India Assesses Options on Future Nuclear Control' (note 100).
102.
Recently, Pakistan announced the creation of its own National Command
Authority, an impressive organizational structure which vests control of the
country's nuclear weapons in a variety of bodies manned jointly by civilian leaders
and the uniformed military. See, 'National Command Authority Formed',
Dawn,
6
Feb. 2000.
103.
For more on this phenomenon in the Cold War context, see Scott Sagan, 'Nuclear
Alerts and Crisis Management',
International Security
9/1 (Spring 1985) pp.99-
139; Joseph I. Kruzel, 'Military Alerts and Diplomatic Signals', in Ellen P.Stern
(ed.),
The Limits of
Military Intervention
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1977)
pp.83-99; and, Kurt Gottfried and Bruce Blair (eds.),
Crisis Stability and Nuclear
War
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988) pp.234-43.
104.
Chengappa,
Weapons of Peace
(note 65) p.437.
105.
Senior Indian policymakers have already indicated that India could withdraw its
unilateral moratorium on explosive nuclear testing should that action comport with
its national interests. See 'India Can Still Conduct N-Tests, Says Jaswant',
Indian
Express,
25 Nov. 2000.
106.
There are in principle many variants beyond the two alternatives discussed here.
These variants can be derived by manipulating the following three variables—the
size of the force, the degree of integration between weapon components, and the
patterns of command, control, and custody—in different ways.
