Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
Camp David
Barak tried to bring the peace process to a successful conclusion. On September 4, 1999, he
met with Arafat in Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt, to sign a revised Wye River Accord proposing that
a Framework Agreement on Permanent Status issues be reached by February 13, 2000, and a
comprehensive peace treaty be secured by September 13, 2000. In the interim, Israel would
turn over small additional pieces of the West Bank to the PA.
Israel opened a Gaza -West Bank “safe passage” for Palestinians on October 25, 1999. But
then Arafat raised objections: the maps that Israel had given him were inadequate, he said, and
the areas it was turning over were too sparsely populated and not in a prime location. Although
talks broke down, in March 2000, Israel pulled out of another 6.1 percent of the West Bank.
In November 1999, Barak, Arafat, and Clinton met in Oslo to discuss the best way to reach
a full peace agreement to end the confl ict, which had always been the goal of the peace process.
For years, Israel had been told that to move toward peace Arafat needed to achieve dramatic
progress and have the prospect of establishing a Palestinian state. Clinton also knew that he
himself would be a lame duck after November 2000, when a successor was elected, and his
term would end in January 2001. Time was running out for him to broker a deal. Both the
United States and Israel were certain that the moment had come to go all out to reach full and
fi nal peace. So Clinton invited the two sides to Camp David for what was intended to be the
last act of a successful peace process.
Fearing that Barak would offer too much to Arafat at the summit, three right-wing parties
left the government, breaking the coalition and necessitating a close vote of confi dence on the
eve of Barak's departure. But Barak had accepted this risk for peace and acquired a mandate
to go ahead to the talks as prime minister. For the fi rst time, an Israeli government would
even offer to give up most of east Jerusalem, a hitherto unthinkable concession, to achieve
peace. Danny Yatom, Barak's chief of staff, explained the leadership's thinking: “We went to
Camp David because it was clear that that was the only way to fi nd out if there was the possibil-
ity of striking a deal.” Barak himself said he hoped that “Arafat would rise to the occasion and
display something of greatness, like Sadat and King Hussein at the moment of truth.”
Negotiations at Camp David began on July 11, 2000, and continued intensively for two
weeks. All of the issues were discussed, including Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, borders be-
tween the two states, and Israeli settlements. In the end, Clinton presented Israel's proposals
for further talks. For its opening bid Israel offered all of the Gaza Strip, 92 percent of the West
Bank (the exact places were not specifi ed), and most of east Jerusalem for a Palestinian state.
The United States offered $21 billion in compensation for the Palestinians. Arafat rejected this
proposal but presented no initiative of his own. It was clear that Arafat had no intention of
making a deal, and Clinton blamed him for the collapse of negotiations.
The events of 2000 changed the Israeli worldview more than any development since the
victory in the 1967 war. Israel had assumed that if it offered enough, the Palestinian side would
make peace. Did Arafat's rejection of the proposals mean that Israel's assumption was wrong?
Was some detail or Israeli action causing the peace process to fail? Was the Palestinian side,
at least its leadership, not ready for a deal? These were questions around which Israeli politics
