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and policy developed after 2000, especially given the Second Intifada, which was about to
start.
The idea that concessions would bring peace was challenged by both Syria's and the PA's
rejection of unprecedented Israeli offers of well over 90 percent of their demands. Mainstream
politicians and groups could no longer persuasively argue that Syria merely wanted the Golan
Heights back and that Palestinians simply sought a state of their own. This view was reinforced
when Arafat also rejected Clinton's fi nal Israeli offer, presenting even more unilateral conces-
sions, in December 2000.
In addition, withdrawals from southern Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip had
increased the level of terrorist attacks on Israel while reducing Israeli deterrence. The conse-
quences undercut the assumption that giving up territory would reduce neighbors' enmity, a
conclusion reinforced by the onset of the Second Intifada in late 2000 and, several years later,
by the effect of the total Israeli pullout from the Gaza Strip.
The high level of Western and international criticism of Israel not long after Camp David
failed, combined with weakened Western governments' support, also belied what Israel had
been told for years: that if it only made concessions and took risks, the world would recognize
that Israel genuinely wanted peace and would rally to its side.
THE SECOND INTIFADA
U.S. attempts to salvage negotiations continued after the Camp David talks collapsed, but the
Palestinian leadership was already planning a violent second intifada, organized by Fatah's
West Bank grassroots leader Marwan Barghouti. The September 28, 2000, one-hour visit of
Likud leader Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount / Haram al-Sharif compound in Jerusalem's
Old City provided both pretext and occasion for starting the uprising. Barghouti's Tanzim
group in Fatah led the uprising with Arafat's support. Arafat chaired coordinating meetings,
which included Hamas. Barghouti later explained, “I knew that the end of September was the
last period” before the uprising could occur, “but when Sharon reached the al-Aqsa Mosque,
this was the most appropriate moment for the outbreak of the intifada.”
Because Barak was still focused on reviving the negotiations, he did not want to respond
too harshly to the violence, especially since at fi rst it was not clear whether the Palestinian
response to Sharon's visit to the mosque — rioting and clashes between Palestinians and the
Israeli police and military —was a brief incident or part of a campaign. So he was slow to ad-
just his policy to the new development. For many Israelis, his hesitation made the government
more unpopular.
With Palestinian violence and IDF actions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip escalat-
ing, Arafat and Barak went to Paris on October 4, 2000, to meet with U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright and CIA director George Tenet, as well as with UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan and French President Jacques Chirac. Eventually Barak and Arafat agreed that
Israel's army would withdraw to its pre - September 28, 2000, positions and Arafat would quiet
the protests and violence. But differences on other issues precluded any agreement to have a
ceasefi re. At one point, Arafat tried to leave the talks, and Albright had to run after him and
persuade him to return.
 
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