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peace treaty, it was time to fi nish the process, especially since Western governments kept telling
Israel that Arafat needed a material outcome to satisfy his constituents and remain in power.
Clinton held Israel-Syria negotiations in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, starting in Decem-
ber 1999, but no progress was made. As a last resort, on March 25, 2000, Clinton met with
Syrian president Hafi z al-Asad to make Israel's U.S.-sponsored offer. Barak proposed an Israeli
withdrawal from the entire Golan Heights to the international border. As a step toward meet-
ing the inevitable Syrian demand for more, he proposed giving Damascus fi shing rights on the
Sea of Galilee and creating a joint peace park on the northeastern shore. Asad said no.
The almost decade-long Israel-Syria peace process begun in Madrid in 1991 came to an un-
successful close. Most Israelis concluded that even if Israel offered big concessions, the Syrian
regime simply was not prepared to make peace.
Withdrawal from Lebanon
Barak's Lebanon policy followed the Netanyahu government's April 1, 1998, decision to accept
UN Security Council Resolution 425, which called for Israel's full withdrawal from Lebanon.
PLO invasions from Lebanon in the 1970s had led Israel to attack in 1978 and 1982, preserv-
ing in the end a buffer zone for security along the border. Israel's government conditioned its
withdrawal on Lebanon's government guaranteeing security on their common border, which
Lebanon refused to do. Consequently, the IDF remained in the security zone; otherwise, Pales-
tinian groups, as well as Hizballah, the new threat, could have continued to stage cross-border
attacks.
In 1998 twenty-three IDF soldiers were killed in the security zone in Lebanon, mainly in
Hizballah attacks, but the IDF succeeded in blocking attacks from Lebanon into Israel that
might have been even more costly. As time went on, the Lebanon operation became increas-
ingly unpopular within Israel as casualty lists continued to grow. The Four Mothers group,
begun by mothers of IDF soldiers, sparked a movement favoring withdrawal.
On July 15, 1999, soon after taking offi ce as prime minister, Barak stated that even if no ac-
cord was reached with Syria, he would unilaterally withdraw IDF soldiers from Lebanon. This
withdrawal took place on May 24, 2000, and the United Nations confi rmed that Israel was now
compliant with the Security Council resolutions mandating a pullout.
Within Israel, the actual implementation of the move was perceived as damaging Israeli
deterrence power. The withdrawal took place quickly, leaving the allied South Lebanese Army
in the lurch. That army collapsed, and Hizballah took over southern Lebanon. The radical
Islamist group's fortifi cation of the area and claims of victory made Israel's action appear more
a defeat than the tactical readjustment it was supposed to be.
Hizballah made new territorial claims: that the tiny Shaba Farms area, universally regarded
as part of Syria, was occupied Lebanese territory, which meant that Israel was still occupying
part of Lebanon. It began attacking Israel in small operations, fi ring rockets and trying to send
squads across the border. Once again, a hostile force ready to go to war controlled Israel's
northern border. To the perception that concessions to Syria had not brought peace, many or
most Israelis added the conclusion that giving up territory worsened Israel's strategic situation
and actually increased the possibility of war.
 
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