The Role of Civil Society in Pandemic Preparedness - Innovation in Global Health Governance - page 123

Social and economic analysis has suggested that civil society is also changing, and a
separation between advocacy and delivery of aid is emerging—and the 'freelancing'
unaffiliated advocate. This process does not focus on the larger question of what
(or who) is civil society, but, after the cardoso report, this question is worthy of
its own focus. It is hoped that this chapter will expose opportunities and gaps for
the grassroots and international civil society organisations that are already working
at containing the effects or spread of avian influenza in creative partnerships with
governments, citizens, and the private sector.
Notes
1 the opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not of the United nations
association in canada.
2 Indeed, the discussions and recommendations in an earlier draft of this chapter had a
direct influence on the work done by the special appointee of the United Nations secretary
general and on the International Federation of red cross, among other organisations.
3 One factor divides society from total disaster: the virus has yet to develop eficient
human-to-human transmission (WHO 2005; Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO],
World Organisation for Animal Health [OIE], and WHO 2005).
4 In an infected pig cell, avian inluenza mutates from an avian to a mammalian virus,
which can lead to a human epidemic. the H5n1 virus had moved to pigs by april 2005
(Fao and oIe 2005a; wHo 2006; Garrett 2005a).
5 the poultry farm losses in 2004 cost thailand US$1.2 billion, vietnam US$0.3 billion,
and all of asia as much as US$15 billion (wHo 2005, 54).
6 Avian inluenza was suspected in 57 persons, conirmed in two, and killed none (Tweed
et al. 2004). the results would have been more severe had it been the H5n1 strain.
7 on the need for multi-stakeholder collaboration, see Fao and oIe (2005a), colin
bradford (2005), and M. otte, r. nugent, and a. Mcleod (2004).
8 For example, the Un secretary general (2005) appointed a senior system coordinator for
avian and human influenza in 2005.
9 the wHo took the unprecedented step in 2003 of independently issuing global alerts
and travel advisories about SarS-affected countries without their authorisation, causing
serious economic damage. although some complained, including canada, none publicly
challenged the wHo's authority during the outbreak (see chapter 4). In May 2003, its
members formally empowered it to take such actions in the future (see Fidler 2004b).
10 In January 2005, vietnam, for instance, established an inter-agency working group
consisting of technical experts and senior staff members from ministries of health,
agriculture, and rural development all in close consultation with the international agencies
(wHo 2005, 55; osterholm 2005).
11 on the issue of mutual interest, see David Heymann and nick Drager (2004).
12 Despite a rhetorical commitment to disease inancing, aid not only continues to fall short
of the wHo targets, but has also been cut in recent times (Soni 2004; Garrett 2005b).
13 Some 50 percent of the projects submitted to the Global Fund to Fight aIDS, tuberculosis,
and Malaria for financing are never approved due to technical imperfections, especially
a lack of absorptive capacity (Kuchenbecker 2004). the Global Fund took back its
money earmarked for Ukraine for that reason. according to ricardo Kuchenbecker