Environmental Engineering Reference
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(2004), bilateral initiatives, such as the U.S. President's emergency Plan for aIDS relief
(PePFar), might offer an 'advantage over the Global Fund, which simply making
grants'.
14 Some 20 percent of the chickens sold in Hong Kong's live poultry markets were infected
with the H5N1 virus and later identified as the source of infection in its chicken farms in
1997; H5n1 was also discovered in the geese sold in the live poultry markets in vietnam
three years before the chicken farms outbreaks in 2004 (Fao, oIe, and wHo 2005).
Studies in Vietnam have confirmed that some 20 percent of seemingly healthy ducks
are constantly shedding the HPaI virus. Yet vaccination is not feasible because ducks
react differently to the vaccine from chickens, and even continue to excrete the virus in
increased quantities (Fao, oIe, and wHo 2005; wHo 2005).
15 For example, in canada, as a result of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (bSe), the
CFIA (2008) enhanced regulations to control 'specified risk material' in the animal feed
chain (i.e., to prevent bovine remains from being fed to other farm animals). the agency
ought to review the animal feed restrictions in order to ensure that risk material would
also encompass parts from dead chickens and should consider banning the imports of
meat that may have been fed in such a way.
16 Such a commission could be tasked with reviewing the use of all growth promoters and
identifying the ones that play a role in increased drug resistance (Garrett 2005a). It could
also develop a global action plan for antibiotic resistance with country-level monitoring
and reporting (Fidler 2004b), as well as enforcing standards that, caused by short-term
need, might also produce long-term equity.
17 It might be worth considering a 1976 piece of U.S. legislation that assigned corporate
liability to the federal government in order to encourage the quick development of the
swine influenza vaccine; that pandemic never happened, and congress has not passed a
similar law (Garrett 2005a).
18 the wHo convened a meeting in november 2004 to map out the respective responsibilities
of all the key stakeholders—major influenza vaccine manufacturers, regulatory authorities,
governments, and the WHO itself—to ensure a sufficient supply of the vaccine. It
determined that the predicted shortfall could only be overcome through collaboration in
the form of public funding, research, and partnerships. the pharmaceutical industry made
some headway in research and development following the initial H5n1 alert in January
2004, but more remains to be done (wHo 2005).
19 the real impact of vaccines remains unclear. Despite the rapid vaccine development in
1957 and 1968, limited production capacity meant it arrived too late to be effective (wHo
2005).
20 For example, two U.S.-based companies produce most of the world's masks from multiple
component parts imported from various countries. If travel and transport were restricted
in a pandemic, neither would be able to meet a jump in demand—in fact, masks may not
be produced at all (osterholm 2005).
21 of the eight MDGs, three are health goals and other ive are crucial to health (see Bradford
Jr. 2005).
22 For example, the ministers of health of canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, United
States, United Kingdom, Mexico, and the european commission created the Global
Health Security Initiative, initially to deal with bioterrorism in 2001.
23 Mainstreaming environmental considerations would also help inform the decisions of all
those governments that ban free-range farming (in favour of less humane indoor facilities)
and order the slaughter of millions of wild waterfowl or culling of domestic birds.
 
 
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