Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
on the other hand, there is also a need to take risks, including the risk involved
in working together to seek solutions from policy to implementation. this proposal
is not revolutionary, least of all in canada: several lessons can be taken away
from the so-called 'track II' governance model that has served so well in the past:
first, partnership delivers—if governments and nGos can overcome their mutual
apprehensions about teamwork (see cameron 1998). Second, even small powers,
united in a coalition of the likeminded and acting jointly with global civil society,
can mobilise to serve the marginalised. third, traditional mechanisms, which work
as long as states are willing to move as fast as the slowest in the pack, can—and
should—be bypassed when they stand in the way of urgent action (cameron 1998).
'ad hoc multilateralism' or coalitions of the likeminded may be preferable in crisis
situations. nevertheless, canada's 'new multilateralism'—an attempt to engage
both state and non-state actors on key global issues in a variety of traditional and
innovative forums—should fit within the Un matrix and not act as a substitute for
it; it should move the consensus forward, without detracting from the inclusiveness
and universality of the Un's framework. ottawa's health ministerial in october
2005 was a real-life example of such a response. the potential emergency presented
by avian influenza warrants the Track II human security model every bit as much
as landmines did. It also justifies governments reaching out to their civil society
partners for help, expertise, guidance, legitimisation, delivery capabilities, and
support. civil society organisations, for their part, are obliged to provide capacity,
directions, and solutions, as well as to raise red flags when necessary, including on
their own culpabilities.
And if the avian influenza never comes, will this all have been a flap over
nothing? clearly not: today no one is adequately prepared to face any virulent,
bioterrorist, or cataclysmic enemy. the approach put forward in this chapter is an
integrated, law-based, human security strategy, designed not only to bolster defences
against this specific fearsome virus but also to build system resilience—to build true
emergency preparedness. Forging partnerships and increasing fairness, equity, and
transparency in general, beyond the immediate time horizons, will leave individuals
better equipped to repel other threats. the global perspective will also encourage
adequate redistribution of resources (envisaged in the MDGs) by channelling scarce
supplies first to those in greatest need. This is a good investment, whatever the future
brings. It will never be possible to create a disease-free world (Garrett 2005b). but if
the big epidemic comes, individuals will be more likely to be ready.
Civil Society Action
civil society has the opportunity to collectively identify and address concerns about
avian influenza. Civil society must raise the same issues: cooperation (of civil society
organisations), vaccine development and access, surveillance and capacity. there are
other questions on technical capacity, apart from advocacy or aid delivery. answers
to the challenging questions of capacity, both human and technical, will need to
move from national or bilateral to multilateral. a study at the Brazilian Institute of
