IS SPECIESISM OPPOSED TO LIBERATIONISM? - Ethics and the Beast - page 3

to have their interests considered preferentially relative to those individuals who lack
that property.” 5 These senses overlap but are not equivalent, and throughout this
chapter I will attempt to distill a precise sense of the term that contradicts liberation-
ism.
As for “liberationism” (reaching back to Singer's Animal Liberation , a topic that
has revived the modern version of animal ethics), I shall use “liberationists” and “lib-
erationism” as umbrella terms covering many distinct views that have in common:
A. The belief that nonhuman animals are systematically expelled from the pale of
substantial moral consideration either by objectification or by downplaying the manner
by which moral concerns ought to inform our animal-related conduct.
B. The sense that numerous animal-related practices ought to be substantially re-
formed or eliminated.
C. An undertaking of a transformation in one's own personal conduct in relation to
animal-related practices. For example, boycotting some commodities, or modifying
one's diet, clothing, footwear, or choice of cosmetics (all or some of these are suffi-
cient for C).
To be less abstract, the term “liberationists” includes philosophers such as Singer,
Regan, Godlovitch, Ryder, DeGrazia, Sapontzis, and Cavalieri as well as other philo-
sophers who write on behalf of animals and are less widely known. I am thinking,
too, of numerous nonphilosophers who are advocating a general and substantial re-
form in our conduct to animals.
SPECIESISM
Speciesism is sometimes identified with believing that membership in the human
species is a morally relevant property. Liberationists have no cause to object to this
sense because it is not exclusive: a speciesist of this kind can also believe that being
a nonhuman animal is a morally relevant property as well. Such a speciesist can even
be an active liberationist. Should liberationists oppose a formulation of speciesism ac-
cording to which humanity is the only species in which membership constitutes a
morally relevant property? They should not. This formulation too can be digested by
a liberationist, who can accept humanity as some special category, distinct from all
other species, yet also hold that moral consider-ability should extend to any being
who possesses a capacity for negative experience. This would mean that, unlike hu-
mans, it is not by virtue of species membership that animals should not be treated in
certain ways, but due to their capacity to suffer or be deprived of valuable experien-
ces. The mere identification of species membership as a morally relevant property
should not bother liberationists.