Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
Chapter 1
IS SPECIESISM OPPOSED TO LIBERATIONISM?
EVER SINCE RYDER AND SINGER introduced the term, “speciesism” has been
seen as the arch opponent of those who strive to reform our relations with animals.
While much is achieved by compelling people to critically evaluate their species-related
biases, my contention in this topic is that allowing the speciesist/nonspeciesist opposi-
tion to govern the call to rethink the moral status of animals is significantly mislead-
ing, unnecessary, and detrimental to this important cause. Throughout this chapter I
will attempt to distill a sense of “speciesism” that actually opposes the pro-animal
claim. It will be shown that endorsing the more intuitive meanings of speciesism
should not trouble liberationists. Consequently, there is no need to replace speciesist in-
tuitions in order to support reform. Speciesism becomes a target for reformers only un-
der an overly strong and unintuitive sense.
“SPECIESISM” AND “LIBERATIONISM”
I need to begin by clarifying what the terms speciesism and liberationism mean
throughout this topic. “Speciesism” has not been used in a uniform sense in the literat-
ure. The term goes back to the beginnings of liberationist literature in the 1970s. R.
D. Ryder gives the following characterization: “Speciesism and racism are both forms
of prejudice that are based upon appearances—if the other individual looks different
then he is rated as being beyond the moral pale. Racism is today condemned by most
intelligent and compassionate people and it seems only logical that such people should
tion of the concept also appeals to prejudice: “Speciesism—the word is not an attract-
ive one, but I can think of no better term—is a prejudice of attitude of bias toward
the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other
and more as a way of dissociating animals from moral entitlement: “A speciesist posi-
tion, at least the paradigm of such a position, would take the form of declaring that
no animal is a member of the moral community because no animal belongs to the
term ties species membership with morally relevant properties, which, in turn, legitim-
ates discounting interests of nonmembers: “Speciesists believe that membership in a
particular species is morally relevant. Morally relevant properties entitle their possessors