Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
Similarly, a mere assertion of human superiority should not, on its own, bother lib-
erationists. Say that someone holds the following (highly popular) position:
Speciesism (1): Humans are more important than nonhumans because they are hu-
man.
Let us ignore possible justifications for this position and focus on what it entails.
Liberationists can wholeheartedly agree to (1), yet refuse to see why or how this self-
commending assertion is connected to any discounting of animal interests. In fact,
forging a link between this definition and overriding interests is possible, but not im-
mediate. The greater value of humans is sometimes taken to be
identical
with claim-
ing that human interests override the interests of nonhuman animals, as if they mean
one and the same. But this identification is mistaken. There exists no simple semantic
equivalence between greater value and trumping interests. Some of the things we
value have no interests at all (e.g., works of art). Of the things that do have interests,
it is possible and plausible to sometimes allow the interests of the less valued entity
to overmaster the interests of the more valuable one. One can, for example, agree
that the value of the lives of numerous strangers living in some distant country out-
weighs the value of the life of one's child, yet still allow the interests of the latter to
take priority. A factory may value Bill more than other workers yet refuse to dis-
count the interests of other workers when they clash with Bill's.
“Greater value” (leaving the nature of this open) does not simply
mean
discounting
interests. But perhaps weaker connections than semantic equivalence are able to tie
value to trumping interests. Does the greater value of A over B
entail
the devaluing
of B's interests when these conflict with B's? Or, short of logical necessity, does
greater importance make such favoritism
plausible
? If the above counterexamples to
semantic equivalence make sense, then the answer is negative here too. Susan will
save her aging father before she rescues an important scientist even if she admits that
the latter's life is more valuable. Greater value (even if it can be conclusively de-
termined) is only one of several considerations that jointly determine whose interests
come first. Consider, too, the opposite direction: preferential policies hardly ever ap-
peal to importance, and they can easily belittle the importance of importance. Coun-
tries, for example, are obliged to help their own citizens before they assist others. Yet
this preferential policy does not stem from a belief in the greater value of these cit-
izens, and it may even be endorsed by a government that, for some bizarre reason,
believes that its own citizens are less important. The assumptions that appear relevant
here relate to what being a citizen means and the special obligations that this im-
poses. In sum: greater importance does not hook (logically or probably) onto a dis-
counting of interests.
