Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
6.4
Effects of Neopatrimonialism on Water Institutional Reform
This chapter will assess the characteristics and dynamics of the neopatrimonial institutional
context of water reform and the effects it has on actors' behavior. The neopatrimonial political
institutions as described in chapter 4.3 shape perceptions of problems and options and provide
concrete incentives or constraints for actors. Four variables have been identified institutions
of decision making, institutional conditions in the agricultural sector, institutions of local go
vernance, and institutional linkages plus one interfering variable: donors as institutions. How
do these factors actually influence the processes of water institutional reform? This will be
analyzed in this chapter for each of the four factors. The interfering variable will not be ana
lyzed individually but rather in each aspect.
6.4.1
The Impact of Institutions of Decision Making on WIR
This aspect will look at how neopatrimonialism influences which actors are involved in the
decision making process for WIR, whose problem perceptions gain access to the agenda, and
whether decision making is characterized by joint or fragmented policy making. It will be
shown how the strategies and interests of actors are shaped by the institutional context. Finally,
we will shed light on the special role donors as actors play in decision making: I will argue that
they not only directly influence the formulation of water policy and laws, but also already have
an impact on the problem perception.
As described in chapter 5.5.2, the institutions of decision making are characterized by an
increasing dominance of the presidential apparatus on policy formulation, internal agenda
setting, and limited participation of NGOs or other actors external to the government bureau
cracy. Also concerning water, decisions on laws, policy, and finance are made by the govern
ment (and then approved by the Parliament). Stakeholders and civil society are at the utmost
consulted, but do not actively participate. Although the discussion on the national water strate
gy and the national water code took so long, there was hardly any public knowledge about it.
The Commission on the National Water Strategy was established under the President and
headed by the MISI, which subordinate to the President, not by the
DepVodKhoz
. The MISI
also participates in many of the international donor projects on water. From the two new
coordinative councils formed, the one that is probably more important, on hydropower, is
directly subordinate to the President.
However, there is still a certain degree of openness of the decision making process. Ac
tors from concerned ministries and agencies as well as academic institutes were involved in the
development of the Water Code and the National Water Strategy. However, they mainly
evolved as veto players and not as active agenda setters. This role is rather performed by do
nors: In the case of the Law on Water User Associations it was ADB and the World Bank that
put it on the agenda. They have ongoing projects to establish WUAs for which they needed a
legal foundation. The new Water Code is said to have been developed mainly by USAID. They
all therefore represent donors' problem perception and not those of Kyrgyz political actors.
Only in the case of the Law on transboundary water did agenda setting occur by way of two
members outside the government and the Presidential administration. This is connected to the
authority they gained in Soviet times, one as a party cadre and one as an academic. Especially
striking is the wide non appearance of the Parliament. It only became active in its resistance to
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