Water Institutional Reforms in Kyrgyzstan - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 119

the ISF and in the making of the Law on transboundary water. Apart from Usulbaliev, Parlia
mentarians were never mentioned in interviews.
Foreign consultants are actively involved in the development of almost all major reform
projects. There was a wide perception among national water experts that international consul
tants have more influence on the government's decisions on water issues than do the country's
own specialists. Several interviewees pointed to the de facto decision making power of donors
with slogans such as: “The one who pays orders the music” 172 or “The one that finances com
mands” 173 . 90 percent of the budget of the water sector is provided by donors. 174 This is partly
project based lending and grants (especially for rehabilitation) but also general funding by way
of which donors influence, albeit not necessarily directly, policy directions. National scholars
from universities and NGOs are rarely involved despite their considerable professional exper
tise. Their participation is mainly reduced to implementation, where it does not threaten exist
ing decision making patterns. Academic expertise generally involves only the IWP&HP of the
Academy of Science and the institutes affiliated to the DepVodKhoz , like the Institut Irrigatsii .
University scholars complain about their exclusion from projects. 175 For lower level stakehold
ers, no institutionalized participation mechanisms are in place (Hassan et al. 2004: 12).
Agenda setting is therefore essentially dominated by a relatively confined range of actors.
This 'partial openness', as I will call it, allows for a certain scope of actor involvement but has
unintended negative consequences: the internal agenda setting and decision making process
leads to a highly fragmented policy. The administrative fragmentation and insecurity is mir
rored by a policy fragmentation with inconsistent policy programs and ineffective framework
laws. Each agency sees water from its own point of view and priorities and has an correspond
ing strategy. Each has a different understanding of water. As each ministry is interested in the
strategy that is most “lucrative” for its budget allocations, no joint understanding and decision
can be reached:
“The water specialists speak in different languages and they are therefore not able to come to an agreement. And
if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs then also takes part, then there is no decision, no compromise possible at all”
(Representative of NGO, Bishkek, 09/12/2003). 176
The organizational self interests of the respective ministries are one main obstacle to reform
(ISRI, Socinformburo, FES 2004: 51). All ministries are confronted with insufficient allocation
of financial means to conduct their work. If competencies and responsibilities are reorganized
and eventually assigned to another agency, this would mean a further reduction in funding.
Each ministry therefore tries to preserve as much competencies as possible. 177 As was already
shown in the chapter on the Water Code, agencies fear loss of competencies, which explains
their resistance to implement mechanisms or accept policy documents that foresee a realloca
tion of competencies. This also hinders the introduction of basin management: “No ministry
and no agency agree to a reform of water management on hydrographic principls. If the state
172 „ , .“ Author's interview with a senior official at the DepVodKhoz ,
Bishkek, 09/11/2003.
173 „ , . “ Author's interview with a former senior official of the MEChS , Bishkek,
09/16/2003.
174 Author's interview with a senior official at the DepVodKhoz , Bishkek, 09/11/2003.
175 Author's interview with a university professor, Bishkek, 10/01/2003.
176 „- ,
( ), , .. ,
.“
177 Author's interview with local consultant for international donor organization, Bishkek, 05/24/2005.