Water Institutional Reforms in Kyrgyzstan - The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States - page 117

rather rare probably not much more than the mandatory one time per year. In general, coun
cils of WUAs are weak and do not effectively carry out their function.
These findings are not unique to the case study area; rather similar conditions could be
observed in other places as well. An internal World Bank project evaluation showed that in 102
WUAs, either the head of aiyl okmotu or his deputies are members of the council. 171 Some a/o
heads even held themselves the position of the WUA chairman (Musabaeva, Jailoobaev n.d.:
2). In many cases, the a/o is related to WUA development from the beginning. The support
departments followed a top down approach, especially in the first years. They relied on the aiyl
okmotus to help set up WUAs and to organize the first meetings, as the support departments
themselves do not have sufficient capacities. Generally speaking, WUAs cannot be regarded as
existing independently from state structures. The transfer of local irrigation management to
WUAs therefore still needs time and support before it will be successful and sustainable.

6.3.6 Summary

To conclude and summarize the results of the previous subchapters: There are two water laws,
one concerns domestic and one foreign water policy, which both do not receive wide support.
Both seem to have been approved only to satisfy the pressure of certain actors (one time do
nors and one time old Soviet nomenclature). Neither is accompanied by adequate implementa
tion mechanisms. In the case of the National Water Strategy, which is meant to be the basis for
laws, without a powerful actor with a strong interest in finalizing it, it was not possible to offi
cially adopt it. It can be argued that no coherent policy or reform exists as a result of an
inclusive decision making process. The administrative fragmentation, considered one of the
main problems of the Kyrgyz water sector, results in fragmented policy making.
However, despite the lack of clearly stated policy norms and objectives, there are pro
grams to implement reforms. Yet these did not meet their objective, either: Administrative
reorganization towards hydrographic principles and the establishment of a coordinating body
to overcome fragmentation turned out to be pure paper tigers. ISFs are not effectively imple
mented even though elite commitment can be assumed. Hardly any WUAs are are financially
and organizationally stable and independent. How can these difficulties be explained? The next
chapter will discuss the impact of the previously defined factors of the neopatrimonial regime
on the politics of water institutional reform.

171 Author's interview with a WUA development specialist, OUP RIS , Bishkek, 09/15/2004.