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non-existent beings should not count in the aggregation of welfare.
Only the welfare of beings that do actually exist should count.
9
This
view is equivalent to the above-mentioned presentism. The
extended Prior
Existence View
counts not only the welfare of actually existing beings in
moral deliberations. Next to the welfare of actually existing beings, it
counts the welfare of those who will exist anyway. More precisely, in
counts the welfare of those who do already exist and of those who will
exist, independently of the decision that is at issue.
10
Thus, the Prior
Existence View
distinguishes between beings who will exist
regardless
of the partic-
ular action we are now contemplating ... and those beings whom we
are now considering creating.
11
Those who exist regardless of the particular action we are now contem-
plating are accorded moral status. Those whose existence depends on
the action that is contemplated are not accorded moral status, i.e. their
welfare does not count in the aggregation of welfare.
This framework of discussion can be sketched as follows:
Do potential beings count in moral considerations?
Restricted Prior Existence View: No, only actually existing beings
count morally.
or
Extended Prior Existence View: Only existing beings count, as well as
those
who will exist, regardless of the choice we are now contemplating
.
Potential beings whose coming into existence depends on the choice
we are now making do not count.
versus
Total View: All existing beings and all potential beings count morally
(including contingent beings).
12
The Restricted Prior Existence View will not concern us in this study.
It is usually considered an implausible theory because it implies that
we have no moral obligations whatsoever towards future generations.
Furthermore, and more importantly, the Restricted Prior Existence View
does not play any prominent role in the debate that I will be concerned
with. Henceforth, when I talk about the Prior Existence View, I refer
to the Extended Prior Existence View. Thus, the opposing views I am
concerned with differ on whether the possible welfare of contingent
beings should count in the evaluation of outcomes.
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