Total View versus Prior Existence View - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 76

4 Are both views coherent utilitarian views?

Considering the basic elements of utililtarianism, namely welfarism,
maximization, impartiality, and universality, it seems that the Prior
Existence View is in need of justifications for what concerns imparti-
ality. After all, impartiality means that each counts for one . It means that
the welfare of every affected being has to be taken equally into account.
The Prior Existence View implies that the welfare of contingent beings
should not be included in the evaluation of an outcome. This seems to
be at odds with the requirement of impartiality.
An example will make this clear. Consider, again, the case of the couple
contemplating whether or not to have a child. Here are the distributions
of welfare, one for each outcome:

Outcome A: remaining childless Outcome B: having a child

Welfare level Welfare level

Man 10 Man 9

Woman 10 Woman 9

Child Ω Child 9

The child in this case is a contingent being: whether it will exist at all
depends on how the moral choice in question is decided.
The Total View would count the welfare of the couple, as well as the
possible welfare of the contingent child, and therefore would require
choosing outcome B. The Prior Existence View would not count the
possible welfare of the contingent child. It would require choosing
outcome A, because outcome A maximizes welfare across necessary
beings. How can it be justified within utilitarianism to take only necessary
beings into account? It seems that this is at odds with the utilitarian duty
to impartially maximize welfare. How can a utilitarian neglect the welfare
consequences for the child in this example? After all, if the couple chooses
to have a child, that child will exist. Not to include the child's welfare in
the aggregation of welfare for this outcome is in need of justification.
A utilitarian can offer such a justification. Utilitarian proponents of the
Prior Existence View need two assumptions. First, they need to assume
the Person-Affecting Restriction. This particular view about what matters
in the evaluation of outcomes has been introduced in Chapter 2. It holds
that not the quantity of welfare as such matters in the evaluation of
an outcome. Instead, as we have seen, the Person-Affecting Restriction
focuses on how people are affected . More specifically, it focuses on whether
and in how far people are made better off or worse off in an outcome. An