Total View versus Prior Existence View - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 74

i.e. whether the being is a necessary or contingent being. The other view,
the Total View, does not make such a distinction. 5
3 Prior existence view versus total view
In the field of animal ethics, the Replaceability Argument evokes the
question of whether to take into account the potential welfare of poten-
tial beings in the aggregation of welfare. In animal ethics, two opposing
positions on this issue are discussed: the Total View is opposed to the Prior
Existence View. The Total View represents category (c) above. It is the
(only) view that always and fully counts the possible welfare of possible
beings in the aggregation of welfare. In Chapter 2 I have mentioned the
example of a couple contemplating whether or not to have a child. The
child is a possible being: it does not yet exist, but it may exist. Thus, the
Total View would take the possible welfare of this possible child into
account in the aggregation of welfare. Assuming, as in the example, that
the parents would be slightly less happy after having the child and that
the child would be very happy, on the Total View the welfare of the
child can compensate for the welfare loss of the parents. Thus, on the
Total View, having the child would be the better outcome, even if the
parents would be less happy with a child. In general, the Total View has
the following implication: On the Total View ,
we aim to increase the total amount of pleasure (and reduce the
total amount of pain) and are indifferent whether this is done by
increasing the pleasure of existing beings, or increasing the number
of beings who exist. 6
The Total View counts the welfare of possible beings. Hence, when
considering whether to kill and replace an animal, the Total View would
count the possible welfare of the possible next animal that would take
the killed animal's place. Therefore, the Total View, as has already been
mentioned, would allow the Replaceability Argument.
The rival view to be explored in this topic is the Prior Existence View. 7
On the Prior Existence View , we
count only beings who already exist, prior to the decision we are
taking, or at least will exist independently of that decision. 8
Two versions of the Prior Existence View have been distinguished. The
restricted Prior Existence View holds that the potential welfare of as yet