The Replaceability Argument - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 66

reduce the scope of the Replaceability Argument. The view proposed
by Singer implies that there is at least something to be said in favour of
procreation, even if having children is not what a couple prefers. On a
large scale, the view rules out a common decision of the world popula-
tion to stop reproducing. Indeed, this is an implication that Singer seeks.
The moral ledger model would imply that there is nothing wrong with a
general voluntary stop on reproduction. Singer makes it explicit that his
stipulation of desire-independent value is intended to morally criticise
such a general voluntary stop of reproduction.
At the same time, Singer admits that instead of accepting preference-
independent value, a preference utilitarian might just bite the bullet and
accept the implication that all of us would be better off having not lived. 34
'Is this too absurd to take seriously?' Singer asks. 35 Apparently it seems
quite absurd to Singer because as we have just seen he is prepared to radi-
cally revise his moral theory in order to avoid that implication. That life-
time welfare can only be negative or at best neutral is an implication of
the moral ledger model, which - as I have already mentioned - resonates
nowhere else in Singer's work. It is remarkable how Singer struggles with
some unwelcome implications of his theory. It seems that Singer, as prob-
ably most of us, finds it implausible that all of us are in principle replace-
able, or that all of us would be better off having not lived. How problematic
is it that a moral theory has counter-intuitive implications? This issue will
be discussed in Chapter 8, in particular in relation to utilitarianism.
Thus, Singer's most recent strategy for limiting the scope of the
Replaceability Argument consists of either accepting the unmodified
moral ledger model or of accepting it along with desire-independent
(and maybe even welfare-independent) value. This strategy seems
ad-hoc, as either way the implications do not resonate with the rest of
Singer's work. If the acceptance of desire-independent value implies that
a person's life can have positive value, it does also imply that persons
are replaceable. So this move, as theoretically remarkable as is it is,
does not help. On the other hand, accepting the original moral ledger
model implies that the lifetime welfare of all of us can never be posi-
tive. This seems to have far-reaching practical implications for utilitari-
anism, comparable to those mentioned in David Benatar's Better Never to
Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence . According to Benatar, the
world population should be reduced to zero by ceasing to have children,
because life is not worth starting. 36
5.7 Summing up
I have explored some implications of Singer's recent efforts to restrict
the scope of the Replaceability Argument. The unmodified moral ledger