The Replaceability Argument - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 67

model implies that all of us would be better off having not lived. It rules
out the possibility of positive welfare and positive value. Modifying
this moral ledger model by shifting down the neutral zone in order to
avoid the implication that all of us would be better off having not lived
requires the choice between two horns of a dilemma: either we have
neutral and even positive welfare and are thus replaceable, or we have
negative welfare and our death involves no direct welfare loss at all. In
that latter case, we would not even need to be replaced, simply killing us
would do. Acceptance of the unmodified moral ledger model in conjunc-
tion with acceptance of desire-independent value also confronts us with
two horns of a dilemma: either our lives can have positive value or not.
If our lives can have positive value, we can be killed and replaced by
others whose lives have as much positive value as our future lives would
have had. If our lives cannot have positive value, we cannot be replaced
without causing greater welfare loss, but then simply killing us would do.
Killing us would, ceteris paribus , maximize overall value.
Singer's strategies for restricting the scope of the Replaceability
Argument are ad-hoc: they do not fit well with the rest of his theory.
The modified moral ledger model necessitates drawing the line for
neutral welfare somewhere below the point of full preference satisfac-
tion, and that can only be done in an arbitrary way. Furthermore, if
personhood and thus replaceability comes in degrees, it seems that
beings are more or less easily replaceable, rather than either replaceable
or not. If after replacement a remaining welfare loss is accepted or can
be compensated by things besides the newly created being, it is unclear
where the line should be drawn between who is and who is not replace-
able in that way.
The moral ledger model is based on an account of welfare that does
not fit with how people usually experience welfare. Usually people expe-
rience welfare as ranging between positive and negative, rather than
as only negative or neutral. In addition, Singer's account of welfare is
linked to a particular definition of welfare, i.e. the desire-satisfaction
account. It is also linked to a particular view on the harm of death,
which is focused on hanging desires. It is not compatible with all other
possible definitions of welfare or views on the harm of death. Finally,
only the unmodified moral ledger model in combination with Singer's
view of welfare succeeds in restricting the scope of the Replaceability
Argument. This account has the implication that all of us would be
better off having not lived.
The conclusion is not that the scope of the Replaceability Argument
cannot be restricted. I have rather shown what the implications of
such a restriction would be. Proponents of the Replaceability Argument