Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
In any case, the implications of Singer's new account of welfare would
need to be shown.
However, it would not do for Singer to accept a hedonist account of
desire-independent value. Crucially, the reason Singer accepted the moral
ledger model in the first place was to show that persons are not replace-
able. They are not replaceable, because killing them leaves a minus on
the welfare scale and that minus cannot be compensated by bringing
about a new person. This is because, according to the moral ledger model,
that new person cannot score positive on the welfare scale either: even
if all her preferences are fulfilled, the score will be no more than zero.
This whole story changes when welfare is considered to consist of desire-
fulfilment along with pleasure. If pleasure is taken into account as well,
a being can score positive on the welfare scale. If it scores positive on the
welfare scale, the implication that it would be better off having not lived
is avoided. However, in that case it does not hold any longer that this
person is irreplaceable. Hence, again, it seems that Singer cannot have
it both ways: claiming that we are not replaceable because our welfare
is always negative and avoiding the implication that all of us would be
better off having not lived by accepting that our welfare can be positive.
Now, what else could be a preference-independent value? According to
Singer: 'We could hold a pluralist view of value and consider that love,
friendship, knowledge, and the appreciation of beauty, as well as pleasure
or happiness, are all of value.'
33
This can be understood as Singer suggesting
an alternative account of welfare, maybe an objective-list account with
those items on the list. If this is the case, my above-mentioned comments
are applicable here as well: If this implies that welfare can be positive,
persons are no longer irreplaceable. Another way of understanding this is
that Singer is suggesting an account of value that is not only desire-inde-
pendent, but also welfare-independent. Then, the items Singer mentions
would be considered valuable, independent of their contribution to
welfare. Again, such an account of value would need to be justified and
to be related to the rest of Singer's theory. The resulting theory would no
longer be a welfarist moral theory, and therefore, depending on how one
decides on terminological issues, it would arguably not be a utilitarian
moral theory any more. Furthermore, as on this view the lives of persons
could yield value, however defined, this value could be positive and hence
persons would no longer be irreplaceable.
Singer's acceptance of different kinds of values necessitates the
weighing of those values against each other. This would result in a very
different form of consequentialism, and it is remarkable that Singer
would embrace it just in order to save the moral ledger model and to
Search WWH ::
Custom Search