Notes - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 169

28. Singer (1993, p. 132).
29. Alternatively, Singer might refer to the level at which we judge a life not
worth starting. Arguably, this level would be higher, closer to zero. Wherever
the level is set: either one is replaceable, or one is better off having not lived.
30. Singer (1998, p. 391).
31. Singer (2011, p. 114).
32. Singer (2011, p. 117).
33. Singer (2011, p. 117).
34. Singer (2011, p. 118).
35. Singer (2011, p. 114).
36. Benatar (2006).
5 Total View versus Prior Existence View
1. Again, this is an abstract description of what happens in the relevant cases of
animal use that I have mentioned in the first section of Chapter 1.
2. The argument that focuses on the fact that this animal which we are consid-
ering killing would not exist if it were not for being used and killed is another
argument. This argument, called the Logic of the Larder, will be discussed in
Chapter 9.
3. Those positions might also be defended in soft versions. It can, for instance,
be claimed that the welfare of possible beings or the welfare of a certain
category of possible beings should count for less , rather than not at all. I will
not consider the soft versions here, as they have basically the same problems
as the strict ones.
4. Arrhenius (2000, p. 152).
5. In addition to the Prior Existence View, there are other views that make a
distinction on the basis of the modal features of a being's life. The most
prominent of those is 'actualism', which counts those beings that do exist,
have existed or will exist, and does not count 'merely possible beings', i.e.
those who might but will in fact never be actual. I will, however, discuss only
the Prior Existence View, because this one is most relevant for the evaluation
of the Replaceability Argument, which is the purpose of this topic. Actualism
would imply that when the animal one considers killing is not killed, the
possible welfare of the never actually existing replacement animal needs not
be taken into account. However, if the animal one considers killing is in fact
killed and replaced, the possible welfare of the replacement animal, which
is than an 'actual' (it will once actually exist) being, must be taken into
account. Thus, when the animal is killed and replaced, this action turns out
to be morally right, and when the animal is not killed, this action turns out
to be morally right as well. The problem is that what one actually does deter-
mines who will be actual. The discussion in animal ethics, and the discussion
concerning the Replaceability Argument in general, is limited to the Total
View and the Prior Existence View, both to be discussed in this topic.
6. Singer (2005, p. 103).
7. Arrhenius (2000) calls this view Necessitarianism, because it counts only
necessary beings, i.e. those who exist or will exist independently of the moral
choice that is contemplated.