Notes - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 170

8. Singer (2005, p. 103).
9. Pluhar (1995, pp. 190-1) ascribes this view to Salt (1892).
10. Singer (2005, p. 87).
11. Pluhar (1995, p. 193). See also Sapontzis (1987, pp. 194-5).
12. Note that 'Total' here refers to the maximal scope of moral objects. All
actual beings along with all potential beings count as moral objects. Their
(potential) welfare has to be taken into account in moral considerations.
This is not the 'total' of the total view as a method of aggregation. The
'total' of the 'total view' as a method of aggregation refers to the fact that all
effects on welfare should be summed up. This holds independently of how
the scope of moral objects has been determined. So, while the 'total view' is
about how to aggregate, the 'Total View' is about across whom to aggregate.
I distinguish those views by using small or capital letters respectively.
13. Arrhenius (forthcoming) has denied that those assumptions together imply
the Prior Existence View. Arrhenius' argument will be discussed and dismissed
in Appendix E.
6 Can Existence Be Better for a
Being Than Non-existence?
1. Holtug (2001, p. 369).
2. Holtug (2001, p. 369).
3. Parfit (1984) and Broome (1993) adhere to this argument.
4. Holtug (2001, p. 372).
5. Holtug (2001, p. 373).
6. Narveson, (1978, p. 48). See also Warren (1996).
7. Heyd (1994).
8. Narveson (1978, p. 48).
9. Bradley (2009a, p. 98 ff.)
10. Luper (2009).
11. Luper (2007, p. 244). Cited in Bradley (2009a, p. 102).
12. Bradley (2009a, p. 103).
13. Bradley (2009a, p. 103).
14. Bradley (2009a, p. 104).
15. Luper (2009).
16. Bykvist (2007, p. 343).
17. Parfit (1984, p. 489).
7 Person-Affecting Restriction and Non-Identity Problem
1. See Parfit (1984, p. 358).
2. This case is based on Parfit (1984, p. 367). See also Singer (1993, p. 123).
3. Although cases like this one are commonly brought forward in order to illus-
trate the Non-Identity Problem, even by Parfit, they are less clear than both
before-mentioned cases. It is less clear that it holds for each individual that
he or she could not have existed in the other outcome and thus be personally
harmed or benefited by the policy choice. Roberts (2007) has made this point.