Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
will allow it to behave naturally, and is prepared to take some risks to give the dog the joy of
freedom. The difficult question is: which dog has the better quality of life?
Even if we turn to science for advice, it will not be possible to give an indisputable answer
to the question. Of course it is necessary to get all possible information and knowledge regard-
ing how certain conditions affect the animal's quality of life. However, animal welfare is not
only a matter of facts. It is also a question of what is considered important in life (Tannenbaum
1991). Researchers and philosophers have for several decades attempted to establish one defi-
nition of animal welfare, but today there is a common understanding that animal welfare is
not only about facts, but also about values. Consequently, the interplay between facts and
values, or between science and ethics, makes a single definition impossible.
The practice of ethics (i.e. normative ethics) scrutinises our basic values: what we consider
good or bad, right or wrong in life (Frankena 1963). Animal ethics in particular deals with the
relationship between humans and animals and the norms that establish a good and right rela-
tionship. Fundamental questions such as the appropriate degree of welfare (do animals have a
right to claims on welfare at all, or can they without further thought be used for human pleasure?)
have to be addressed. If we decide that animals should be granted welfare, then in this world of
limited resources, the next question to be answered is when is welfare 'good enough'?
Ethics also includes welfare quality:
what
is
good quality of life for an animal? Therefore,
when evaluating animal welfare issues in organic farming systems, we need to understand if
particular organic 'values' can be used to help guide decisions regarding appropriate quantity
and quality of animal welfare.
Organic alues
Organic farmers are a heterogeneous group, having various goals and opinions. However, the
development of organic farming, including standards for organic production, has been pursued
by the organic movement based on some shared values. When the values of organic farming
are discussed in this chapter, the values refer to those of the organic movement, not individual
farmers. Organic farming has substantial roots in ecological and biological farming practices
espoused in the early 20th century (e.g. Balfour 1943), and in the environmental movements
from the 1970s and 1980s (Christensen 1998). Biodynamic farming is an exception, since it is
based on the philosophy of Rudolf Steiner and his ideas about farming (Steiner 1929). However,
in spite of this different philosophical background, practical biodynamic animal husbandry
has much in common with that of other parts of the organic movement. Here biodynamic
farming will not be further considered.
It is possible to relate basic values in organic farming to ethical theories (Lund and Röck-
linsberg 2001, Verhoog
et
al
. 2004). Such theories dealing with the human-animal or human-
nature relationship are often roughly divided into four categories depending on their focus of
moral concern (moral concern implies that humans in their actions must consider the inter-
ests or rights of those beings or entities encompassed by it). These categories include:
anthro-
pocentric,
sentientistic,
biocentric
and
ecocentric
theories (Stenmark 2002):
1 anthropocentric theories argue that only humans have direct moral status;
2 sentientistic theories argue that all sentient beings have direct moral status;
3 biocentric theories defend the view that all living beings have direct moral status, regardless
of sentience; and
4 ecocentric theories state that all species, ecosystems and other relevant features in nature
have direct moral status.
