Nationalism has been defined in a variety of ways at different levels of analysis (e.g., Kohn 1955, 1968; Symmons-Symonolewicz 1970; Kamenka 1973; Plamenatz 1973; Smith 1976, 1981; Snyder 1984). The concept combines a sense of identification with a people, an ideology of common history and destiny, and a social movement addressed to shared objectives. This definition raises questions about what differentiates a people or a nation from others, the nature of identification, the conditions under which nationalist ideologies develop, and the course and aims of nationalist movements.
Historically the term nationalism was applied to attempts to follow early European models ”to make the boundaries of the state and those of the nation coincide” (Minogue 1967, p. 12), that is, to create loyalty to a nation-state (Kohn 1968). It was also applied to struggles, proliferating after World War II, to gain independence from colonial domination andjoin the community of sovereign states. More recently, however, analysts have found the confusion between the concepts of state and nation to be a hindrance to understanding contemporary nationalism. Only rarely, if at all, do the boundaries of a state coincide with those of a nation. By nation we mean an ethnic group that (1) shares one or more identifying characteristics, such as language, religion, racial background, culture, and/or territory; and (2) is politically mobilized or is amenable to such mobilization. Thus, nationalism should be distinguished from patriotism, in that the identification and loyalty in the former is to an ethnic group or nation, and in the latter to the state.
IDENTIFICATION
Debates centering on the intrinsic nature of collective ethnic identification feature variations on two general themes—primordialism and structuralism. Implied in the primordial perspective is a deem-phasis on an instrumental view of ethnic ties. These ties are seen as ends in themselves shaped by forces other than material self-interest; they are persistent and they resist the homogenization predicted by convergence and modernization theorists. The essence of these ties ”is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it in the subconscious conviction of its members from all other people in the most vital way” (Connor 1978, quoted in Stack 1986, pp. 3, 4). These bonds stem from ”immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them . . . from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practice” (Geertz 1963, pp. 14, 15). Thus, there can be multiple identities—for instance, a Moroccan may identify with an ethnic group within Morocco, the Maghrebs of North Africa, the Arabic speaking people, and the Muslim people at large. These identities assume varying significance depending on the context, lending credence to the old saying ”My brother and I against my cousin, and my cousin and I against the stranger.” To structuralists, ”ethnic identity results instead from objective intergroup differences in the distribution of economic resources and authority” (Hechter 1986, p. 109). Implied here is rational choice and self-interest, that ethnic ties are means to certain ends, and that the boundaries of ethnic groups are changeable.
Neither primordialists nor structuralists would deny the obvious variations in the intensity of identification and in the potential for nationalist movements cross-culturally and over time. Several factors are expected to contribute to these variations. Among the more important of these factors is coterminality of characteristics. In most instances multiple characteristics are involved in distinguishing among ethnic groups—in an overlapping manner at times and coterminously at others. The United States offers an example of overlapping identities where people from different racial backgrounds share the same religious orientation, people with different religious orientation share a common language, and there is no territorial ex-clusiveness. This overlap in ethnic identification is credited in part with lowering intergroup tensions (Williams 1947). At the other extreme are peoples in southern Sudan, Eritrea, Tibet, the Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, the republics of the former Soviet Union, the republics of former Yugoslavia, and other places where all or a combination of racial, religious, linguistic, cultural, and territorial maps largely coincide. The greater the number of factors that coincide, the greater the gulf or ”social fault” among ethnic groups along which nationalist sentiments and tensions are likely to intensify (Nagi 1992).
In addition to differentiating attributes and geographic distributions, a number of features of the social structure contribute heavily to variance in intensity and patterns of nationalism. Hechter (1986) suggests two types of such factors. One is the institutionalization of ethnic differences in legal and normative rules, especially those governing property and civil rights, as was the case in South Africa. The other is differentiation in positions in the division of labor that shape ”specialization experiences as well as material interests.” Deutsch offers another factor in nationalism, attributing membership in a people essentially to a ”wide complementarity of social communication” that ”consists in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wide range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders” (1953, p. 71). Communication is subject not only to commonality of language and cultural background, but also to available means. These include networks of social relations as well as the ever-advancing technological means of mass communication.
NATIONALISM
In addition to identification and ”consciousness of kind,” nationalism involves ideology and mobilization for social movement and political action. The ideology stems from identification, the sense of uniqueness of group origin, history, culture, collective authority, and destiny (Smith 1981). Political mobilization and the course of nationalist movements are greatly influenced by a host of internal and external factors. Important among the internal factors are uneven economic conditions and disparities along cultural lines in control of resources, access to goods, and distribution of positions in the occupational structure. The collective perception of an ethnic group of its deprivation or exploitation may challenge the legitimacy not only of the regime but also of the state itself. The theme of ”relative deprivation” has been central to explanations of political violence (e.g., Gurr 1970).
The political system allocates power and authority. An uneven distribution among ethnic groups can be the direct result of exclusionary rules and practices, as in the case of Apartheid in South Africa, or the indirect result of socioeconomic disparities and associated discriminatory practices, as characterized in the relationships between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Whatever the reason, a cultural distribution of power is as evocative of a nationalist sense of deprivation as a cultural distribution of resources. The close relationship between power and resources led Lasswell to observe that politics is ”Who Gets What, When, How” (1936, p. ii).
Applying a developmental perspective, Huntington (1968) connects political stability or instability to the balance between ”institutionalization” and ”participation.” This line of reasoning suggests to some analysts (e.g., Sanders 1981) a linear relationship between political development and political instability—in this case arising from nationalism, which is credited with having been the most prevalent reason for state-level violence (Said and Simmons 1976). Support for such a pattern of relationships derives also from the expectation that the national integration and political assimilation characteristic of developed societies contribute to a shift from culturally based to functionally based cleavages. The net result is a reduction in the prevalence and intensity of ethnic mobilization in the more politically developed countries. However, clearly implied in Huntington’s discussion of relations between demand for participation and institutional capacity is a balance at low levels in the least developed countries and at high levels in the developed ones. Imbalances can be expected at early and middle states of development, which suggests a curvilinear pattern.
There is no unanimity on the relationships between development and nationalism. This is understandable in view of the complexity of both phenomena and the current state of research. An important voice on these relationships is that of Walker Connor (e.g., 1972), who contends that modernization, the spread of education, and improved means of mass communication are responsible for a resurgence in ethnic nationalism. Juan Linz observes that ”in the modern world the aim seems to be to build nations rather than states, a task that is probably beyond the capacity of any state that has not achieved the characteristics of a nation-state before the era of nationalism” (1978, p. 62). The distinction between ”level” and ”process” of modernization and development is useful in understanding the rise in nationalist sentiments. As Smith has noted, ”Perhaps, then, it is not the fact of economic progress or decline that is relevant to ethnic revival, but simply economic change per se. Most change . . . is painful and uprooting” (1981, p. 34). Tensions, strains, and dislocations associated with change in the structure and distribution of power—political change—are no less painful or uprooting. Attempts by central governments to secularize and to shift loyalties from ethnic groups to the state underlie much of contemporary nationalism.
NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS
The literature offers two perspectives in explaining the formation of social movements—collective behavior and resource mobilization. In the former, social movements are viewed as responses to a rise in grievances and the actors are seen as ”arational” if not ”irrational”; in the latter they are considered as goal-oriented, rational responses dependent on organization and mobilization of resources (Jenkins 1983). Debates concerning the strengths and limitations of these two perspectives are yet to be settled. Important to a discussion of nationalism, however, is that literature on social movements, especially on resource mobilization, is primarily Western in conceptualization and empirical foundations. Significant in this respect are differences in aims that guide social movements. More common to Western societies is ”changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society” (McCarthy and Zald 1977, pp. 1217, 1218), as compared to nationalist movements that press for autonomy, if not for secession. The first type of movement seeks change through influencing political institutions, the legitimacy of which is not in question (e.g., civil rights in the United States and labor movements in many countries). Nationalist movements, on the other hand, often challenge, if not outright reject, the legitimacy of the state (e.g., Croatia, Slovenia, Bangladesh, Eritrea, and others that eventually seceded from larger states, as well as Biafra, Southern Sudan, Quebec, and others where no separation has occurred). This is not to cast doubt on the applicability of theories of social movements to ethnic nationalism but, rather, to point out that the influence of differences among societies in levels of development, political institutions, types of regimes, and movements’ aims has not been adequately explored (see McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Jenkins 1983).
In the following paragraphs we shall outline some of the important features of nationalist movements and the processes of mobilization. More specifically, we shall consider the role of grievance, resources, repertoires of expression, and aims.
The role of grievances remains unresolved. While traditional analysis places grievances stemming from structural strains associated with social change at the root of movements (e.g., Smelser 1962; Gurr 1970; Gusfield 1970), resource mobilization proponents favor structural ”causal” explanations (e.g., Tilly 1978). Some feel discontent is ubiquitous and therefore, by itself, cannot explain the emergence of social movements. McCarthy and Zald go even further: ”For some purposes, grievances and discontent may be defined, created and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations” (1977, p. 1215). In line with this perspective is Smith’s account of ”ethnic revival” (1981). Smith maintains that the unique and distinguishing rationale of an ethnic group is the emphasis on group belonging and group uniqueness that links successive generations of the group with specific origins and history. Driving the engines of ”historicism” and ”nationalism” are discontented intellectuals, educators, and professional intelligentsia. Blocked mobility, opposition and repression by traditional authorities, and frustrated expectations concerning recognition, especially on the part of Third World intellectuals, are factors in the radicalization of these groups, which then turn to historicism and inward to their ethnic communities (Smith 1981).
In explaining the spread of ”value-oriented movements,” Smelser (1962) refers to ”structural conduciveness.” Two elements of conduciveness are highly applicable to ethnonationalist movements. One relates to the importance of communication in ”disseminating a generalized belief’—a position consistent with that of Deutsch (1953) and Connor (1972), cited earlier. The other is ”the availability of means to express grievances” during troubled or uncertain times in order to redress problems.
Attempts to explain nationalist movements must account for the mobilization of resources. McCarthy and Zald outline five central considerations: (1) ”aggregation of resources (money and labor)”; (2) the form of organization these resources entail; (3) involvement of individuals and organizations outside the movement; (4) the flow of resources to and from the movement; and (5) ”the importance of costs and rewards in explaining individual and organizational involvement” (1977, p. 1216).
The prevailing patterns of social relations are expected to influence the potential for, and forms of, organization and mobilization. Tilly (1978) maintains that combined strength in identification and interpersonal bonds lead to high levels of organization and to greater possibilities for mobilization. In a similar vein Oberschall (1973) offers a classification for patterns of organization. Along one dimension—relations within collectivities— he identifies three types: ”communal,” ”associa-tional,” and ”weakly [organized] or unorganized.” Mobilization, which is facilitated by communal and associational forms, is rendered difficult by the weakly organized and unorganized structures. Along another dimension, Oberschall distinguishes between ”vertical” and ”horizontal” relations to other collectives and segments of society. Social and political bonds across classes and collectivities can influence mobilization; however, the direction of influence can be expected to vary depending on the type of movement. For example, Oberschall observes: ”If in a stratified society there exist [sic] strong vertical social and political bonds between upper and lower classes, mobilization into protest movements among lower classes is not likely to take place” (1973, p. 120). While this may be the case in regard to class conflicts, vertical bonds within an ethnic group can significantly facilitate mobilization.
Strength in family and kinship relations underlies Tilly’s networks of interpersonal bonds and Oberschall’s communal organization. Houseknecht sees strength here as referring ”to the extent to which family/kinship obligations and rights take precedence over their nonkinship counterparts” (1990, p. 1). She outlines important ways in which kinship relates to ethnic identification, nationalism, and the organization of movements. Early socialization builds identification with an ethnic culture and commitment to its values and norms, which continue to be strengthened and enforced through kinship ties. Commonality in cultural background facilitates social communication, and the networks of kinship ties are readily available channels for the mobilization of human and material resources. Furthermore, the traditional authority structure afforded by strong family and kinship systems provides protection in resisting pressures applied by the state’s central authorities.
While informal networks of kinship and interpersonal relations are important to nationalist movements, the role of formal organizations cannot be overstated. As pointed out by McCarthy and Zald (1977), a social movement may include more than one organization; and all organizations in a movement compose a ”social movement industry.” Competition over resources can arise between a movement industry and other commitments, as well as among organizations within the same movement industry. The latter form of competition is common to nationalist movements, as in the case of the Kurds. This frequently encourages the involvement of neighboring states or major powers, and often leads to internal conflicts within movements.
These lines of reasoning concerning the role of kinship and interpersonal relations bring up the unresolved debate over the relative effectiveness of bureaucratic centralized movement organizations compared with those of an informal decentralized nature. While some argue that ”a formalized structure with a clear division of labor maximizes mobilization by transforming diffuse commitments into clearly defined roles and . . . centralized decision making,” others maintain that ”decentralized movements with a minimum division of labor and integrated by informal networks and an overarching ideology are more effective” (Jenkins 1983, p. 539).
Why would individuals and organizations contribute their labor and resources to ethnonationalist movements? To primordialists, the answer is that they do so in order to preserve cultural integrity and a way of life, to maintain group solidarity and social bonds, and to advance the cause of a community from which a sense of security and pride is derived. These are valued ends in themselves. To collective behavior theorists, the answer is in the collective mood, the social contagion, and the state of mind that are engendered in response to the perception of grievances. To structuralists and resource mobilization proponents, the answer lies in rational collective action and the pursuit of interests.
Opportunities for mobilization are also enhanced by the quality of leadership and its effectiveness in articulating the interests of the group. Smelser explains the significance of charismatic leadership to value-oriented movements. Such forms as ”the dreamer prophet of the cult, the nationalist crusader, and the totalitarian demagogue” (1962, p. 355) are compatible with the character of these movements in certain phases of their development. He goes on to point out, however, that ”Insofar as a value-oriented movement receives material from outside sources, and insofar as it inherits an organizational structure, the need for charismatic leadership lessens” (p. 356). Useful here are categories identified by Hermann (1986) to analyze political leaders. Particularly important are such contextual factors as to whom the leaders are accountable, forms of interaction with followers, the constraints defined by constituents’ beliefs and norms, the strength and nature of opposition, and available resources.
Repertoires of expression of ethnic nationalist movements vary along a wide spectrum that includes interest articulation, passive resistance, demonstrations and riots, sabotage and terrorist acts, and internal wars. Patterns of expression are shaped by the style of leadership, the level of organization, and resources. They are also influenced by the reactions of the state as well as by external forces. These expressions represent events in the life history of movements. The points at which these movements begin and end are generally difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain. Thus, what might be referred to as beginnings or outcomes may well represent only arbitrarily defined points in a process.
Ethnic movements differ in aims and strategies. Smith identifies six types:
1. Isolation . … was the most common strategy for smaller ethnic communities in the past. The ethnic community chooses to stay aloof from society as a whole. 2. Accommodation. Here the ethnic community aims to adjust to its host society by encouraging its members to participate in the social and political life of the society and its state. Often, individual members try to assimilate to the host society, or at least become acculturated, for individual advancement. 3. Communalism . … is simply a more dynamic and active form of accommodation . … The aim is communal control over communal affairs in those geographical areas where the ethnic community forms a demographic majority. 4. Autonomism. There are . . . various forms and degrees of autonomy . … Cultural autonomy implies full control by representatives of the ethnic community over every aspect of its cultural life, notably education, the press and mass media, and the courts. Political autonomy or “home rule” extends this to cover every aspect of social, political, and economic life, except for foreign affairs and defense. Ideally, autonomists demand a federal state structure, and this strategy is really only open to communities with a secure regional base. 5. Separatism. This is the classic political goal of ethnonational self-determination . … In each case, the aim is to secede and form one’s own sovereign state, with little or no connection with former rulers. 6. Irredentism. Here an ethnic community, whose members are divided and fragmented in separate states, seeks reunification and recovery of the “lost” or “unredeemed” territories occupied by its members. In general, this is only possible where the ethnic community has its membership living in adjoining states or areas. (1981, pp. 15-17)
Seeking independent rule, as in secessionist or separatist movements, poses the most serious threat to the state. Such movements challenge not only the legitimacy of the government or regime, but also the integrity of the state itself.
It is reasonable to expect that factors shaping the intensity of nationalist movements will, in turn, influence the formation of secessionist goals.
Territorial coterminality with lines of ethnic identification is a strong contributor, with distance from the ruling center adding to the potential for secessionist claims (Young 1975; Islam 1985; Pankhurst 1988). Timing seems to be important to the rise of such claims as well as to their success. Based on the experiences of several African countries, Young (1975) points out that time is conducive when polity in the parent state falls into disrepute, calling its legitimacy into question because of mismanagement, corruption, and discrimination. He also concludes that times of cataclysmic events in the lives of states offer opportunities for secessionist claims because of the fluidity these events engender, the options they open, and the push for choices to be made. Young cites other antecedents that provide a basis for solidarity and mobilization, such as regional differentials in concentration of wealth and representation in power positions, and at least the minimum political resources to make independent status possible even when economic sacrifice is required. To this list of contributing factors, Islam (1985) adds the magnitude of suffering, the impact of the secession of a region on the rest of the country, whether the seceding region represents a majority or a minority of the population, and the involvement of outside powers.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL INFLUENCES
The rise of nationalism and the forms and directions it takes are significantly influenced by forces external to the respective states—regional and global socioeconomic and political conditions, and by the spread of ideologies. The power vacuum created by the liquidation of colonialism after World War II tended to be filled by newly created states where borders had been frequently drawn arbitrarily vis-a-vis ethnic distributions. Regional power struggles, territorial disputes, economic competition, and ideological differences have left many regions of the world fraught with turmoil. Since cultural pluralism is characteristic of most, if not all, of the new states, ethnic nationalism often figures prominently in regional conflicts—as a cause at times, and as a consequence at others. The regional dynamics of ethnonationalism can take many forms. It has been a force behind the formation of alliances among independent states, for instance, the Arab League (1945), the Arab Magreb Union (1989), and the Gulf Co-operation Council (1981). It was also influential in rare cases of voluntary fusion of independent states. Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic (1958) which ”was open to other Arab states to join, but only Yemen entered a loose association”.A military coup in Syria ended its union with Egypt in 1961, and Yemen pulled out in 1966. Ethnonationalism was also used as justification for annexation by force as in Germany’s invasion of Austria and the Sudetenland (late 1930s); China’s occupation of Tibet (1950s); and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (early 1990s), which was repelled by an international coalition led by the United States and including several Arab countries.
The phenomenal advancements in means of communication and transportation have enormously increased the intensity and scope of global relations. Four features of these relations are particularly relevant to nationalism. First is the spread of ideologies related to human rights and the right to self-determination. Reports of abuses of these rights are communicated in a graphic and rapid, if not an instant, manner. They galvanize global public opinion and prod governments to intercede. The intervention of the Northa Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and others in opposition to ”ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia and Kosovo is a case in point. Rapid communication also brings to ethnic communities the successes of others who are engaged in struggles or have succeeded in attaining varying measures of autonomy. Second is the presence of world forums to address these issues and bring to bear the weight of the global community, such as the United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council, the International Court of Justice, and other governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Third is the increasing globalization of the economy, which makes it possible for small sociopolitical units to find multilateral niches, thereby reducing dependency on bilateral economic relations with either former colonial powers or states from which they have seceded. Fourth is the geopolitical relations among major powers. When the world was polarized between the two superpowers—the United States and the former Soviet Union—they frequently supported different sides of conflicts within pluralistic societies, either directly or through proxies. In the past, both countries have taken positions in support of the doctrine of ”self-determination.” President Wilson was a staunch spokesman for the principle during and after World War I. Around the same time, ”at the Seventh All Russian Democratic Labor Party Conference of May 12, 1917 . . . in a resolution drafted by Lenin, the conference unequivocally endorsed the right of all of the nations forming part of Russia freely to secede and form independent states” (Connor 1984, p. 45). In contemporary global relations both countries have shown less commitment to the principle. This became clearly evident in the resistance of the former Soviet Union to the independence of the Baltic States, and in the use of military force to keep Chechnya within the fold of the Russian Federation. The approaches of these powers to nationalism have become subject to strategic and economic interests, tempered by the balance of force that can be brought to the situation. The ebb and flow of relations among these powers exerted considerable influence on ethnonationalism for decades.
The vested interests of other states are usually rooted in resources, trade, security, geopolitical advantage, ethnic affinity, or other ideology. More recently, humanitarian considerations have been assuming greater significance in the foreign policy of the West, most notably the United States, progressing ”from the call for moral pressure in the 1970s, to economic sanctions in the 1980s, to military intervention in the 1990s” (Kissinger 1999, p. 43), as in the case of Kosovo. While the large states ”are likely to intervene for instrumental reasons,” the small ones ”are more likely to intervene for affective reasons” (Heraclides 1990, p. 377). Regional and global influences may strengthen or weaken the state’s means of control and repression, contribute to the movement’s resources and sanctuary, and/or raise awareness and help mobilize regional and global public opinion. These interests and their expression, directly or through international organizations, expand or inhibit opportunities for nationalist movements including those with secessionist aims.
The spread of the ideology of minority rights and self-determination plays a special role in secessionist movements. In a comparative analysis, Sigler concludes: ”There is historical weight to the charge that minority rights is a guise for separatist sentiment” (1983, p. 188). He maintains that the ”concept of minority rights briefly blossomed under the minorities treaties system” (p.190) that followed from the Treaty of Versailles. The system was to protect the rights of minorities in many countries, mostly in Europe, after World War I. It gave jurisdiction to the Permanent Court of International Justice, but litigations became protracted and difficult to adjudicate, thus severely limiting the court’s role. It gave power to the Council of the League of Nations to intervene but did not guarantee that disciplinary actions would be carried out against states for infractions. Mutual reinforcement of a system of states as a basis for international relations restrained the various states from interfering in each other’s internal affairs. ”The collapse of the minorities treaties system . . . has encouraged minority separatist movements …. In the absence of a strong international system for the protection of minority rights, resort to separatist politics may have become more prevalent” (Sigler 1983, p. 190). This reinforces Smelser’s ideas about structural conduciveness mentioned earlier.
If the odds facing secessionists are great, those facing irredentists are much greater. By definition, irredentism involves multiple secessions, which means contending with forces of more than one state. Consider the difficulties facing the Kurds for whom fulfilling the aim of a unified independent homeland (Kurdistan) is resisted by all the states among which they are divided (Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey). An exception was when an ethnic group in one state seeks to attach itself to a neighboring state that includes part of the same group. This tactic is used by some separatists to obtain external support (Young 1975), as in the case of Kashmir that has attracted the backing of Pakistan in its struggle to secede from India. Potential annexation is not necessary for a state to intervene in support of related groups in another state. In the course of extending protection to the Greek and Turkish subpopulations of the island state of Cyprus, war almost erupted between Greece and Turkey.
REACTIONS OF THE STATE
Actions by the authorities and the means of control they employ are largely shaped by the objectives of nationalist movements and greatly affect their course. When perceived as threats to the stability of state and government, they are usually met with repression. However, nationalist movements that remain clandestine and limited under conditions of severe repression tend to gather momentum and erupt into open expression when a new regime, or change in policy, reduces coercion. Recent events in the former Soviet Union and other countries illustrate the point.
Repression is not the only means used by states in responding to threats of ethnonationalism. Some states, such as the former Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, adopted population redistribution policies aimed at diluting the coterminalitiy of ethnicity with territory. Language policies in education are also used to increase homogenization. Data and other information about Russia and the former Soviet Union are more readily available than about China. The ”russification” of Central Asia involved ”several migration waves . . . the most recent of which occurred from the mid-nineteenth century to the 1960′s . . . conquest and incorporation of the region was accompanied by Russian in-migration, first of peasants in search of new farmland and later of semiskilled industrial workers who entered with regional economic development under socialism” (Kaiser 1994, p. 238). For example, between 1926 and 1959, the proportion of Russians in the population of Kazakhstan increased from 19.7 to 42.7 percent, and from 11.7 to 30.2 percent in Kurgyzstan (Koslov 1975, quoted in Kaiser 1994). These policies seem to have been counterproductive because of heightening nationalist sentiments among the native populations who did, and continue to, view the Russians as colonialists who enjoy greater power and resources (Kaiser 1994). Migration is not the only means used in population redistribution; native populations may be driven out in a process of ”ethnic cleansing” as occurred in Bosnia and Kosovo. Central governments in some pluralist states may adopt redistributive policies in regard to resources to assist economic development in lagging regions. Tito’s regime in Yugoslavia introduced such policies which ignited a feeling of being exploited on the part of ethnic groups in the more advanced republics (e.g., Slovenia and Croatia).
Other means in the state’s arsenal are arrangements for power sharing in governance and mechanisms for conflict regulation. Nordlinger (1972) outlines six such mechanisms: (1) a stable governing coalition of political parties involving all major conflict groups, (2) proportional distribution of elective and appointive positions, (3) mutual veto by which government decisions must be acceptable to major conflict organizations, (4) purposive depoliticization in which leaders of conflict groups agree to keep government out of policy areas that impinge upon the various segments’ values and interests, (5) regulation by compromise over conflictual issues, and (6) one group granting concessions to another as a way of managing conflicts. He also sees four motives for leaders to engage in conflict regulation: (1) external threats or pressure, (2) negative effects on the economic well-being of the groups involved, (3) aversion to risking violence and human suffering that might result from unregulated conflicts, and (4) the protection of leaders’ own power position.
Lijphart places equal emphasis on leaders ”whose cooperative attitudes and behavior are needed to counteract the centrifugal tendencies inherent in plural societies” (1977, p. 1). The forms he outlines for ”consociational” democracies overlap in many ways with Nordlinger’s mechanisms for conflict regulation. One important difference, however, is Lijphart’s inclusion of ”segmental autonomy,” that is, federalism. Nordlinger specifically excluded federalism as a mechanism for regulating conflicts because he saw in it a recipe for a breakup of the state.
Emphasis in the foregoing discussion has been on strategies to prevent the breakup of the state. An alternative, however, is to carry out an orderly and peaceful separation. The division of Czeckoslovakia (1993) into two countries (the Czeck and the Slovak Republics), although a rare example, renders this alternative real rather than just theoretical.
OUTLOOK ON THE FUTURE
While forecasting is a hazardous endeavor, especially in regard to such complex and volatile phenomena as nationalism, disciplined consideration of important trends and their implications for the future is warranted. Interest here is in long-term change that may span generations and many decades of evolution. As implied earlier, the forces of modernization and development are intricately interrelated to the prevalence, severity, and modes of resolving nationalist tensions. By modernization, we mean the forces of change in institutions, organization, and behavior in adaptation to the vast and rapid advancement in knowledge and its technological application. In a classic analysis, Black describes the awesome significance of this process:
The change in human affairs now taking place is of the scope and intensity that mankind has experienced on only two previous occasions, and its significance cannot be appreciated except in the context of the entire course of world history. The first revolutionary transformation was the emergence of human beings, about a million years ago, after many thousands of years of evolution from primate life . . .
The second great revolutionary transformation in human affairs was that from primitive to civilized societies, culminating seven thousand years ago. . . . Three [early civiliza-tions]-the Mesopotamian, the Egyptian, and the Cretan-have transmitted their knowledge and institutions to later societies.
The process of change in the modern era is of the same order of magnitude as that from prehuman life and from primitive to civilized societies; it is the most dynamic of the great revolutionary transformations in the conduct of human affairs. What is distinctive about the modern era is the phenomenal growth of knowledge since the scientific revolution and the unprecedented effort at adaptation to this knowledge that has come to be demanded of the whole mankind. (1966, pp. 2-4).
Emerging through this process is change in institutions toward greater capacity for political participation, expanding and more productive economies, and increasing cultural neutrality in the formulation of laws and universality in their application. As has been noted by many analysts of social change, this transformation has been accompanied by change in value orientation toward increasing emphasis on achievement, secularization, individualism, rational choice, the rule of law, and tolerance for differences. Powering this process are mutually reinforcing systems of education, research, and development. Several points are important in explaining the connections between modernization and nationalism.
First, the course of modernization is highly influenced by the ability of leaders ”to keep the delicate balance required for survival between the maintenance of the traditional pattern of values that serves as the basis for cohesion and adaptation to new knowledge that requires a revision of the traditional value system” (Black 1966, p. 4). This ”clash of civilizations” is common to developing and transitional societies; it is often seized upon in mobilizing nationalist sentiments. The resulting mixes tend to negate the notion that modernization means turning other societies into clones of those of the West. In fact, there are pronounced differences among the advanced countries in the configurations of institutions, organizations, and values they have evolved.
Second, ”the challenge … in the societies that modernized earlier was internal, the processes of transformation took place generally over centuries. In the later modernizing societies this challenge has been increasingly external, hence more rapid and even abrupt” (Black 1966, p. 8). As pointed out earlier, rapid and abrupt change in itself can create considerable dislocation in institutions and unpredictability in behavior—conditions of anomie—that are fertile grounds for mobilizing fervor for such emotional causes as nationalism.
Third, with halts at times and set backs at others, modernization is a continual process with different countries, and different peoples within countries, being at varying stages of the process. Certain levels of transformation bring about institutional arrangements, modes of organization, and value orientations favorable to prospects for peaceful and orderly resolution of nationalist tensions. It is no accident that the ethnic sub-populations in Switzerland (French, German, Italian, and others), in former Czechoslovakia (Czechs and Slovaks), in the United Kingdom (English, Scottish, and Welsh), in Belgium (Flemings and Walloons), and in Canada (citizens of Quebec and others), found ways to resolve, or to go about resolving, these issues within peaceful legal frameworks. To be sure, there remain instances of violent conflicts as in the case of Northern Ireland.
The point to be made here is that, in the long run—over an extended span of history—the process of modernization can be expected to lessen ethnic tensions and promote peaceful resolution. At present and in the short run, however, the ubiquity of ethnic conflicts and the escalation in associated violence are to be expected in many regions and countries of the world. In part, this is because of the abruptness of change in general, the pressure built over decades of ethnic differentiation in the distribution of power and resources, and fluidity in the structure of central authorities that suppressed their expression as happened in Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. The influence of fluidity in power structures is illustrated by Naimark in his foreword to a volume aptly entitled The Revenge of the Past:
The collapse of the Soviet Union was caused by nationalism, that is, by the demands of the subject nationalities of the USSR for genuine independence and autonomy. Unified in their hostility to the Kremlin’s authority, the fifteen constituent Union Republics, including the Russian republic, declared sovereignty and began to build state institutions of their own . … With the failure of the August 1992 putsch attempt, sovereign republics obtained their independence. Nationalism reigned supreme” (1993, p. ix).
Another major trend expected to have significant dampening effects on violent nationalism is the development of global and regional governmental and nongovernmental organizations addressed, in part or in whole, to investigating, reporting, and intervening with cases of discrimination and abuses of human rights. Precedents, of historic importance, were introduced in 1999 with the military intervention of the NATO countries in attempting to reverse ”ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo, and the indictment of a head of state and high officials in a serving government by a United Nations Tribunal for ”crimes of war and against humanity.” To focus on the United Nations for a moment, among its achievements over the first fifty years, Alger cites the following:
It has invented new tools such as peacekeeping. It has extended its mission to include violent conflicts within states. It has broadened peace-keeping to include an array of supportive humanitarian operations. It has drafted a broad array of human rights conventions covering economic, social, cultural, civil, and political dimensions. (1998, p. 422).
Finally, other trends with potential impacts on nationalism include the voluntary formation of economic and political federations among states such as the European Union, and the globalization of the economy. The growing interdependence among countries brings to bear the weight of regional and global communities in containing the risks of disruptive violence. Furthermore, these trends facilitate greater autonomy for small sociopolitical units by offering multilateral niches that reduce dependence on bilateral economic relations with the countries in which they are part or from which they have seceded. In other words, globalization and regionalization tend to transfer power and authority from the states upward to the larger structures and downward to local levels, thus, increasing local autonomy. As has already been explained, a host of other factors particular to each situation are also at work.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, it can be said that the current pervasiveness of nationalism should be self-evident. The socioeconomic, political, and other human costs are frequently staggering. In the short and intermediate term, the ubiquity of the phenomenon can be expected to continue. In addition to Africa and the Balkans, there remain significant ethnic tensions, if not risks of violence, in many countries of Asia—Russia, China, and India, among others. However, in the long run, major trends of modernization, economic globalization and interdependence, and the development of international organizations and forums to address the problem, all point to conditions less conducive to the mobilization of nationalist sentiments and more tending to peaceful resolutions of such tensions.
As a major feature of social structure, ethnicity is of central theoretical importance. However, many (and often large) gaps in the state of knowledge exist, both in theory and in accumulated data. Basically, three shortcomings in the literature account for this. First, there are conceptual and theoretical limitations, especially at the intermediate levels of abstraction that connect abstract explanatory schemes—of which a notable few ex-ist—with concrete events. Second, the preponderance of empirical work in this area is in the form of case studies that are mostly historical. These case studies offer uniformity neither in concepts nor in evidence. The third problem with literature on ethnic nationalism is its fragmentation. A coherent picture must draw upon concepts and propositions from a number of traditions, and there are many overriding concepts with which to assemble frameworks to advance theory and to guide the collection of evidence. While they are difficult to plan and execute, there is compelling need for comparative studies to advance understanding of the underlying principles. Clear understanding of nationalism, and of the processes involved, is essential to the evolving of appropriate educational, policy, constitutional, and other legal means for accommodating cultural diversity.
