During the mid-1950s the Middle East became a pivotal point within the system of cultural, political, and ideological conflict known as the Cold War. The sensitivities of newly independent governments to questions of sovereignty and nationalism made the struggle to define “imperialism” in ways that advanced the interests of one protagonist at the expense of the other perhaps the central contest of the propaganda war in the Middle East. Certainly it is no longer possible to accept the argument, promoted by Western security specialists during the 1980s, that the Soviets stole a march on the United States (handicapped by its alliances with Britain and France) in setting the ideological agenda in the developing world. It is now clear that both sides in the Cold War propaganda battle sought to depict their adversaries as imperialist, expansionist, and aggressive while proclaiming their own commitment to the principles of peaceful coexistence, nonaggression, and respect for the sovereignty of the states whose support they wished to enlist.
Soviet propagandists fostered the idea of a malevolent “Western imperialism” in terms familiar to any student ofV. I. Lenin’s (18701924) analysis of capitalism and imperialism (a task facilitated in the Middle East by the presence of British military bases and Western oil companies). The immediate objective of Soviet propaganda was, if not to replace Western with Soviet regional hegemony, at least to make life as awkward as possible for Western strategists keen to preserve a status quo that left British and American influence predominant across the region. To that end, Moscow Radio, Soviet information workers entrusted with inserting material into Middle Eastern newspapers, and local Communist groups influenced by Moscow all sought to stimulate distrust of the Western powers. The expansion of the TASS news agency’s services in the Middle East in the 1950s reflects the importance attached to the region by Soviet policymakers.
The Soviets also seized upon the Arab-Israeli dispute as a means of stirring up regional instability. In 1953 an anti-Zionist campaign was initiated that, though it had the effect of undermining Communist groups in Israel, was clearly intended to open the West to Arab charges of pro-Zionism. This strategy enjoyed limited immediate success. While it undoubtedly put Western policymakers on the defensive, U.S. and British diplomats stuck rigidly to policies of studied neutrality with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, with Britain in particular only too happy to score propaganda points in the Arab world through strongly worded condemnations of Israeli raids across the Jordanian and Egyptian borders.
Another serious concern for Western propagandists was the development of a strong neutralist trend in the Middle East, which posed more of a danger to Western than Soviet interests since, given the pro-Western status quo, any neutralist drift by an Arab government would mean a shift toward the Soviet Union. Since the exclusion of the Soviet Union from any position of influence in the Middle East was a fundamental tenet of U.S. strategic policy, Western propagandists launched a major antineutrality campaign in the 1950s. Pamphlets illustrating the folly of neutrality were disseminated across the region in a bid to deter Arab governments from diplomatic flirtation with the Soviet Union. Many cited historical examples (Belgium’s experience at the hands of German aggression in 1914 and 1940 was a particular favorite), and some were authored by leading intellectuals (a Bertrand Russell essay was translated and used as Arabic antineutrality propaganda by the British in 1953). Intelligence reports filed by the United States Information Agency (USIA) suggest deep concern over the neutralist and anticolonial ideas promoted by Indian propagandists (who were reported to be more active and effective than ever by the mid-1950s). In addition, the orientation of Egypt toward the nonaligned movement, together with the popular acclaim that greeted President Nasser’s (1918-1970) arms deal with the Soviet bloc in September 1955 suggest that the achievements of Western propaganda campaigns against neutrality were decidedly meager.
Concerned that the Middle East was increasingly vulnerable to neutralist ideas and Soviet subversion, Western propagandists launched a series of anti-Soviet campaigns that differed little from those employed in other regions (indeed, the first three of USIA’s “global themes” all dealt with anti-Soviet and anti-Communist arguments). Anti-Communist propaganda agencies such as Britain’s Information Research Department (IRD) produced enormous quantities of material denouncing Communist totalitarianism and exposing the social and economic hardships of life behind the Iron Curtain. USIA organized cultural events across the Middle East designed to counter Soviet charges of U.S. philistinism. Sports teams, opera divas, and—of particular importance, given the sensitivity of American propagandists to criticisms of racial segregation in the United States—black jazz musicians all embarked on high-profile Middle East tours. Unique to anti-Communist material targeting the Middle East was the bid to mobilize Islam as a barrier against Soviet influence. Both the IRD and the USIA sought to manipulate the content of the Friday sermons of Muslim clerics; both worked to encourage activity at Al Azhar, the leading Islamic university in Cairo. Throughout the 1950s the USIA orchestrated a prominent campaign to publicize statements by Muslim intellectuals stressing the essential compatibility of Western and Islamic ideals and values. Communism was consistently denounced as a “godless creed” and the persecution of Muslim minorities within the Soviet Union provided a potent theme for Western propaganda agencies.
Nevertheless, Western propaganda struggled to make a serious impact on Muslim opinion. The view that Israel, not the Soviet Union, was the most immediate threat to Arab security left the West’s Cold Warriors preaching to an audience that proved reluctant to interest itself in the dangers supposedly posed by “Red Colonialism.” By the end of the 1950s, a significant section of the Arab world, with Syria and Egypt in the vanguard, had shifted markedly toward the Soviet camp, a development that, while ultimately a shallow and transient victory for the Soviets, was a clear sign of the impotence of much Western Cold War propaganda in the Middle East.
