The Olympics represent the preeminent venue for athletic competition. Hundreds of world-class athletes converge on the host city to display their athletic skills over a two- to four-week period, depending on whether it is the Winter or Summer Games. These events also draw thousands of spectators, including numerous high-profile dignitaries. This presence alone has important implications for the law enforcement community of the host city and country. The convergence of spectators and athletes swells the city’s population and increases the potential calls for police service. Further, dignitaries and athletes require special security that draws officers away from routine patrol and investigative duties. This security concern is further complicated by the fact that the events are spread across large geographic areas. Security must be maintained around the clock at each of these locations, and must be provided for the dignitaries and athletes as they move to and from these locations. Thus, the Olympic Games can be taxing for the law enforcement agencies of the host city and country.
These service provision and security concerns are further complicated by the high media profile of the events. This attention makes the games a desirable target for social and political protest groups, as well as potential terrorist targets. The 1972 Munich Olympics illustrate that such protests can include violent acts of terrorism. With the initial hostage taking and eventual killing of Israeli athletes, the Black September organization was able to bring worldwide attention to the Palestinian cause. The 1996 Atlanta games were marred by the Centennial Park bombing that killed 1 and injured 112, which was allegedly committed by antigovernment and religious extremist Eric Rudolph. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have heightened the concern about the Olympics being a target for terrorism. This was illustrated with the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Games that commenced five months after these attacks, where the security apparatus for preventing terrorism reached an unprecedented level.
Policing the Olympics in the context of protest and terrorism requires a massive effort, particularly in the United States given the balkanized nature of law enforcement in this country. The events are typically spread across a broad geographical area, as opposed to being within the boundaries of a single city. This means that many local law enforcement agencies within a host area may have an event within their jurisdiction. Each of these agencies will have to find a means for coordinating how many personnel it will devote to covering the added service and security demands in the region, and what type of collaboration is needed to handle these matters in a collective fashion. The necessity for interjurisdictional cooperation in providing security for such an event is another hurdle to be overcome in the provision of security for large events. Bill Clinton’s 1998 Presidential Decision Directive 62 further mandates that these local agencies must also coordinate their efforts with federal law enforcement agencies. This directive articulates that the White House may designate specific high-profile events as National Special Security Events that require federal involvement. When this designation is invoked, the U.S. Secret Service becomes the lead agency for developing, implementing, and managing a security plan. In the case of the 2002 Salt Lake City games this meant that the Secret Service became the primary coordinator of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies involved in Olympic security.
What ultimately results from different departments and agencies coming together to provide safety and security for the Olympics is the creation of a temporary law enforcement organization. For a time-limited period, these independent organizations are expected to function as if they are a single organization with a common purpose. This does not mean that there is a need for the formal merger of the organizations, but temporary protocols must be established. These protocols will have to address jurisdictional and task responsibilities, the creation of coordinating mechanisms for the overall and day-today security and safety response of the games, and the establishment of decision-making procedures for personnel with different task responsibilities. What also needs to be considered within this temporary organization are the other safety and criminal justice organizations that are impacted by the games. Any crisis situations in which citizens, spectators, and athletes are harmed will require this law enforcement apparatus to communicate and coordinate its activities with emergency response entities (fire, EMS, and hospitals). Further, any type of mass arrest situations, say, of protesters at a large demonstration, will require the assistance of the local prosecutor’s office and jail facilities.
During the 2002 Salt Lake City games, a centralized organizational structure was developed to facilitate the functioning of the different law enforcement and emergency response agencies. In 1999 the Utah legislature passed a state bill that allowed for the formation of the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command (UOPSC). This entity, which included representatives from all levels of law enforcement and emergency response agencies, had the responsibility for developing the safety and security plan for the games. The various representatives of this committee negotiated the protocols discussed above. The organizational structure that was created by UOPSC to manage the day-to-day security and safety operations was a hierarchy of command centers. The Olympic Coordination Center (OCC) functioned as the superior command and control center for the games. Underneath the OCC were various regional command centers, referred to as area command centers (ACCs), and Olympic event command centers that were called venue command centers (VCCs).
The OCC had theater-wide responsibility for disseminating information and intelligence to the other command centers. It also coordinated the request for any additional assets that might have been needed to manage crisis situations. This included such assets as crowd control units, hostage rescue/SWAT teams, and federal antiter-rorism units. The various ACCs were responsible for safety and security activities in defined geographical areas that fell outside the Olympic event locations, whether routine or otherwise. The VCCs were responsible for safety and security matters on the perimeter and within the Olympic event locations. The result of this formalized structure was a temporary organization that was able to coordinate the actions of various independent agencies, which critics had argued was lacking at the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta.
While the formal organization created by UOPSC provided a structure for maintaining safety and security, it could not account for all activities needed to carry out these tasks. What also facilitated the functioning of this temporary law enforcement organization was the development and maintenance of a dense web of communication networks among the various agency personnel. It is only through the ability of attentive personnel to accurately identify and communicate problems that the components of the formal structure (personnel, equipment, and so forth) can be put into place to prevent or effectively manage crisis situations. The sustainability of such organizational responsiveness through communication is a product of technical and cultural elements. In the case of the Salt Lake games this technical element included the use of handheld radios, secure Internet reporting systems, and Nextel phone systems. The cultural element of effective communication requires that the personnel in the various command centers envision themselves as being a component within a large organizational system, as opposed to an isolated entity. This was enhanced through training and table-top exercises.
When these temporary, large organizations come together, organizational members need to recognize that their observations may be relevant to others engaged in the safety and security effort, and thus need to be communicated. Further, each organizational member must also be attentive to the needs of others in the overall organization because their experience, knowledge, and resources may contribute the ability of these individuals to solve problems. The catch phrase used during to the Salt Lake games to capture this culture element was for members to maintain a “theater-wide orientation.”
Finally, a risk management orientation is necessary for providing safety and security during the Olympics. All members must keep a preventive posture in which they are constantly scanning for potential hazards in order to head off disaster. Such an endeavor can become trying as the games progress past the first few days and tasks become mundane. It is in this lulled state that organizational members may ignore or fail to communicate hazards within their environment because their recent experience has led them to believe nothing will happen. Whereas security personnel may have treated an abandoned backpack at the beginning of the games as a possible explosive device that warranted the notification of others, the same situation may be seen as not worthy of attention given its routine nature by the second week of the games. While this latter assumption may often be correct, one such lapse in the risk management mind-set may render all the organizational elements for safety and security discussed above meaningless.
