The case of Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436, 1966) is arguably one of the most influential Supreme Court decisions of the latter twentieth century. The practical effects of this narrow 5-4 decision on criminal procedure and police practice are so far reaching that even today, some forty years later, questions and debate persist regarding the scope and manner of its application. This is somewhat surprising given that the Court very clearly spelled out the prophylactic measures to be taken in administering what has since come to be known as the Miranda warning. Specifically, the Court stated:
To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
Although unambiguous on this particular dimension, the continually evolving case law surrounding Miranda and its progeny is anything but clear. This ambiguity stems from the fact that at times the Supreme Court has rendered various decisions strengthening the case and its protective measures, while at other times delivering opinions that serve to weaken them. In the years since the Miranda decision was initially rendered, subsequent cases have clarified the circumstances under which the warning must be given and, once the attending protections have been invoked, the measures that must be taken to prevent their violation. For example, in Edwards v. Arizona (1981), the Court ruled that once a suspect invokes her or his Miranda rights, not only must all questioning immediately cease, but officers are strictly prohibited from reinitiating contact with the suspect even if only to inquire whether or not the person has had a change of mind and wants to confess. This rule was further expanded by the decision in Arizona v. Roberson (1988) where the Court held that police are also prohibited from reinitiating contact with a suspect even where the subsequent interrogation focuses on altogether separate offenses. Interestingly, not only do these and other decisions serve to restrict the actions of police interrogators, but they also go so far as to effectively render a suspect incapable of retracting her or his right to remain silent once invoked. In simple terms, even if a suspect later changes her/his mind and freely decides to talk to the police, s/he is expressly prohibited from doing so. Thus, while a suspect is capable of invoking the protections afforded by Miranda, s/he cannot rescind them later even if they wanted to until such time as an attorney is physically present (Minnick v. Mississippi, 1990).
By comparison, other cases serve to weaken the protections initially afforded under the Miranda decision. For example, the case of New York v. Quarles (1984) created what is now referred to as the public safety exception. In this case, a woman reported to police that she had been raped at gunpoint by a man who only minutes later was apprehended inside a grocery store. Before reading Quarles his rights, the officer asked and discovered where the gun had been hidden. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the public safety interest of an unattended gun in a public location outweighed the officer’s failure to immediately inform Quarles of his Miranda rights. Another case loosening restrictions associated with the initial decision is Davis v. United States (1994), which stands for the principle of law that authorities may continue to question a suspect who has knowingly and voluntarily waived her or his Miranda rights until such time as she or he clearly asks for assistance of counsel. Stated differently, a suspect must clearly and unequivocally indicate a request for counsel before the police are required to stop an interrogation. Under this ruling, statements such as ”I better ask an attorney” or ”Maybe I should talk to a lawyer” do not constitute a clear request for counsel as does the statement: ”I’d like to speak with (or want to see) an attorney before answering your questions.”
With little room for disagreement, television programs centering on law enforcement, investigative, or other law-related themes have undeniably influenced pubic perception regarding when the Miranda warnings must be given and the form they must take. While some might argue that such dramatized depictions serve to heighten public awareness thereby dissuading unscrupulous officers from taking advantage of uninformed individuals, it might also be argued that such television shows have created a gross misunderstanding of the law as it relates to Fifth and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. To illustrate, many individuals possess the erroneous belief that they have an absolute right to remain silent in all verbal exchanges with the police. This is not the case and, in fact, many states criminalize the refusal to provide officers with certain information such as name, date of birth, and place of residence under what are generally referred to as ”failure to I.D.” or ”obstruction” statutes so that individuals who do not provide this information where the officer has probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed become subject to immediate arrest. Additionally, the protections do not extend to routine booking questions when a person is being processed at the jail upon arrest.
Several Supreme Court cases supporting these little-known and often overlooked exceptions to the Miranda rule include Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) and Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990). In Berkemer, the Court ruled that the roadside questioning of a motorist who is detained pursuant to a lawful traffic stop does not constitute a custodial interrogation. Consequently, officers are not required to inform traffic violators of their Miranda rights. In the Muniz case, the Court ruled that not only are police allowed to ask routine questions of a DWI suspect during booking procedures, but they are also allowed to videotape the responses without having to first inform the arrestee of her or his Miranda rights. Additionally, many people erroneously believe that officers are required to read them their rights exactly as they appeared in the original Supreme Court opinion. Although countless television shows have employed the Miranda warnings so frequently that even casual observers are themselves capable of restating them almost verbatim, the Court has since adopted a more relaxed standard by no longer requiring the police to recite the warnings exactly as they appeared in the original opinion (Duckworth v. Eagan, 1989).
As the preceding review makes clear, case law surrounding the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of criminal suspects during custodial interrogation is indeed confusing. While the decision in Miranda was no doubt intended to draw a bright line rule for protecting the rights of suspects during such encounters with the police, it has in many ways created more confusion than expected. Consequently, the Supreme Court still finds itself today, some forty years after its initial attempt to standardize the rule of law on such matters, hearing cases related to Miranda on a regular basis. While crime control advocates would argue that, like the exclusionary rule, the decision in Miranda serves to figuratively handcuff the police thereby making it difficult for them to obtain confessions from criminals who enjoy greater rights than those who they have victimized, others would assert that the protections are necessary to prevent overzealous officers from using coercive methods to obtain confessions from individuals who are truly innocent or of diminished capacity. In either instance, one fact that becomes exceedingly clear is that, for better or for worse, Miranda and its progeny are so solidly rooted in both American culture and jurisprudence that the only question that remains is how to effectively manage its future evolution and application to an ever widening context of contacts between the public and police or other agents of government in a post-9/11 era.
