Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)

In March 1962, an armed robber entered the Diamond Cab Company in Baltimore, Maryland. The robber made off with several hundred dollars but was followed by two cab drivers to a house on Cocoa Lane. One driver radioed a description to the company dispatcher, who then relayed the information to the police. Within minutes, the police arrived at the home, knocked on the door, and announced their presence. Mrs. Hayden answered the door and offered no objection to a search when the police asked to search the house for the robber. The officers spread throughout the house in search of the robber and found him in an upstairs bedroom. During the search for the robber, officers in other parts of the house uncovered several items of evidence. One officer discovered a shotgun and pistol in a toilet tank; another officer found a jacket and trousers matching the robber’s description in the washing machine; and another found ammunition and a cap under Hayden’s mattress. All of the items recovered were introduced against Hay-den at trial. The officers testified that they were looking for either the man or the money in their respective searches of the house.
In Hayden’s habeas corpus petition, relying on Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), the petitioner contended that the clothing seized was improperly admitted into evidence because the items had “evidential value only” and therefore were not lawfully subject to seizure. In Harris, the principal issue was whether a search could be regarded as incident to lawful arrest when the suspect was already in custody before the search was made and any evidence had been seized.
The question before the Court was whether the seizure of the clothes violated the Fourth Amendment because the items are considered to be mere evidence. In its analysis, the Court distinguished Hayden’s case from the Harris case. In the case at hand, the searches occurred prior to or contemporaneous with the arrest of Hayden. The Court reasoned that the police acted reasonably when they entered the house and began looking for the suspect and for any weapons he had used in the robbery or that he might use against the police. The Fourth Amendment does not require the police to halt an investigation if, in doing so, they would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. The Court reasoned that the search conducted by the police was the only way to ensure that the suspect was alone and that the police had control of all the weapons that could be used against them or for an escape. The Court rejected arguments that the officer who seized the clothing in the washing machine was not looking for the suspect or weapons. Instead, the Court made the logical inference that the officer was in search of weapons.
The Court then turned to the distinction between seizure of items of evidential value and seizure of instrumentalities, fruits, or contraband. The Court found that the language of the Fourth Amendment provided for no distinction between the notion of mere evidence and that of instrumentalities, fruits, and contraband; the requirements of the Fourth Amendment secure the same protection of privacy for both. The Court did acknowledge that there must be a nexus, or common set of facts, events, or circumstances, provided in the case of seizure of fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband between the item to be seized and criminal behavior. Therefore, in the case of “mere evidence,” probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction; thus the purposes of a police search must be considered. In this particular case, the clothes found in the washing machine matched the description given to the police and thus could be used to help police identify the suspect.
Launching into a history of warrants in both English and American jurisprudence, the Court dismissed the distinction between the two types of seizure, stating that it was unsupported by language in the Fourth Amendment. To the Court, the right of privacy is disturbed to the same degree in both instances, and thus the clothing seized in Hayden’s house was admissible, regardless of the purpose for which it was seized.
The dissent, given by Justice  O. Douglas, viewed the question before the Court differently. The question, in the eyes of Douglas, was whether the government could lawfully seize testimonial evidence pursuant to a proper search warrant, to be used at a trial, where otherwise the Fifth Amendment would bar such evidence. Douglas viewed the evidence of the clothing as testimonial because it identified the suspect, and the suspect should be free from such evidence viewed as self-incriminatory.