Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
aspects of the system of governance of both unions make the move towards the
nationalization of politics before the Great Depression a moderate one.
The constitutional protection of states' rights is inherent to federalism. Such
a protection works as a powerful source of centrifugalism in any policy domain
recognized (whether explicitly or implicitly) under states' authority by the con-
stitution. Essentially, any attempt to redraw the original allocation of policy
responsibilities requires either a constitutional reform or, in previously under-
developed policy domains, a careful political balance between national needs
and states' rights. Such was the case in both Canada and the United States
before the Great Depression. Social welfare was a residual, subsidiary task to
be undertaken by lower levels of government and charitable institutions. Writ-
ten at a time when public welfare was a rather inexpensive tool for public order
and contention of the most destitute sectors of society, the Canadian Constitu-
tion explicitly left these matters to municipalities and provincial governments.
Similarly, state and local authorities were in charge of organizing relief in the
United States (the dole system), as social assistance did not belong to the pol-
icy domains under federal control (Banting
1987
; Skocpol
1992
). In addition,
in both cases, launching a national public welfare system would require rais-
ing additional revenues, which in turn would trigger a constitutional conflict
over the appropriate instruments and level of government to do so. In sum,
the constitutionalization of states and provinces' authority over public welfare
provision before the Great Depression enhances their relative position in any
potential reform.
Along with the protection of
self-rule
, the second defining feature of
federations concerns the organization of
shared rule
(Elazar
1987
). The idea
of shared rule refers to a panoply of political and institutional mechanisms
that facilitates the representation of territorial interests in forming the national
will. In the United States the primary mechanism is a highly malapportioned
upper chamber, the Senate. The Senate is composed of two representatives
directly elected by the population of each of the fifty states, empowered with
a tight grip over the legislative process. By contrast, the Canadian Senate is an
empty shell. Provincial executives, through a system of institutionalized inter-
governmental relations, provide a functional equivalent for the representation
of provincial interests in Ottawa. Regardless of their specific form, the impact
of these representative provisions on the balance of power between the federal
government and the states (
) is not obvious ex ante. A third mechanism, the
organization of the party system, mediates the leverage granted to subnational
units within the system of representation. Rodden (
2006
) illustrates this logic
in the case of fiscal discipline. Under unclear divisions of authority, govern-
ments at different levels have incentives to transfer the cost of their policies
to other levels. Subnational governments, for instance, have an incentive to
incur debt and hope to be bailed out by the center whenever the financial crisis
reaches its limit. Because regional governments do not know how committed
to fiscal discipline the central government is, they will adjust their political
behavior according to their expectations regarding the central government's
