Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
resoluteness. Integrated national party systems make the resoluteness of the
central government more credible and facilitate the enforcement of discipline
by reducing incentives for regional incumbents to behave irresponsibly. An
integrated party system affects the incentives of subnational incumbents in two
different ways. First, local elites regarded as a liability for the overall electoral
profile of the party face severe consequences in terms of their own political
careers. As a result, opportunistic behavior by local incumbents is likely to be
constrained (Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 2003; Rodden and Wibbels 2002;
Wibbels
2001
). Second, an integrated national party system helps solve the
commitment problem between incumbents at different levels of government
by intertwining their political fates. In turn, partisan harmony and electoral
coattails feed back on each other, facilitating the long-term cooperation
between different levels of government and the party's organization. This
renders commitments between local and national elites more credible, and
facilitates policy coordination between levels of government, thus muting the
centrifugal tendencies in the union.
From this perspective, the assessment of the balance of power between the
federal government and the states in the United States and Canada depends
upon the characteristics of the party system in the period preceding the Great
Depression. Historical studies on both sides of the border convey a very similar
picture, one of extremely fragmented political organizations controlled by local
barons mostly responsive to the interests of their local constituencies. Describ-
ing the “brokerage politics” era in Canada, Carty, Cross and Young (2000)
refer to the 1920s as “the golden age of political regionalism in Canada. The
dominant politicians of the period were regional political bosses articulating
regional interests and carrying their regions with them as they practiced a pol-
itics of accommodation [ . . . ] The preeminent party structure of this era has
been described by Whitaker as the
ministerialist
party- an organization run by
powerful regional chieftains whose control of the cabinet offices of the national
government allowed them to engage in the political bargaining necessary to
maintain their electoral support” (p. 17). In turn, Finegold and Skocpol (
1995
)
describe the Democratic Party of the pre-New Deal years as one “of southern-
ers and city bosses” (p. 41). Earlier, the progressives had failed to “dethrone
the political bosses who in alliance with the holders of concentrated economic
power defended the status quo [ ...],toeliminatetheintermediatepointswhere
the public will was corrupted, and restore the power of the people” (Sundquist
1983
: 43). Put simply, national parties were rather weak organizations on both
sides of the border.
8
The “one party factionalism” in the South (Key
1949
)was
8
The Liberal Party in Canada eventually grew more centralized than the Democratic Party in
the United States. This development, however, took place primarily after the Great Depression
occurred, not before. For a detailed history of the Liberal Party in Canada and the timing of its
territorial integration, see Whitaker (
1977
). Indeed, even during the late 1930s, when dicussions
over the redesign of public insurance programs were well underway, there was quite a bit of
conflict within the liberal party itself (Struthers
1983
). I return to this issue in
Chapter 5
.
