Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
an effective attack. As an emergency manager and responder, it is imperative to
not only know, but also understand, this cycle. Doing so helps a discipline better
prepare, respond, and possibly interdict the next terrorist attack.
Successful terrorist operations are seldom self-contained undertakings. This
holds true for large international terrorist groups that leave a much longer logistics
trail and for so-called “lone wolves” who act alone or within a very limited circle of
witting or unwitting accomplices. Even “lone wolves” are not free from the burden
of applying the tools of their trade. Very few individuals have the requisite techni-
cal, physical, financial, and logistical skills to mount an operation without reaching
out to like-minded individuals or sympathizers for assistance. In the age in which
we live, considerable assistance can, of course, be gleaned online, but surfing the
Internet for information can take one only so far, and it carries with it its own set
of perils and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it is probably safe to say that no one has
carried out an attack in the real world solely by using materials and techniques
acquired in the cyber world. At some point, this online knowledge and technical
skills must be translated into real-world applications and actions.
In looking at individual terrorist operations, we sometimes exhibit a bit of myo-
pia in that we tend to think that any method of attack that does not follow the
pattern of recent attacks must be new. A closer look, however, reveals a set of recur-
ring themes. And although the methods of attack are constantly being refined in
an attempt to adapt to security countermeasures, the terrorists' basic repertoire
remains pretty much fixed.
For example, the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, were carried out
by individuals highly trained in light infantry tactics and equipped with assault
rifles, grenades, and relatively small explosive charges. Such tactics had been dis-
carded in recent times in favor of large-scale, mass casualty attacks, but they can
be traced back to the very beginnings of the current wave of terrorism that dates at
least from the second half of the twentieth century. Although the Mumbai attack-
ers took advantage of some newly available commercial technologies—global posi-
tioning systems, voice over Internet protocol, personal data assistants, etc.—the
basic tactics they used were not all that different from those used by members of
the Japanese Red Army in an attack in May 1972 on Tel Aviv's Lod Airport. In this
attack, the perpetrators hid their assault rifles with removable stocks in violin cases
and, upon entering the airport, removed the weapons from the cases, assembled
them, and started firing indiscriminately, ultimately killing 26 people.
This same scenario was reprised more than 13 years later, when on December 27,
1985, the Abu Nidal group, using Libyan-supplied assault rifles and grenades, launched
virtually simultaneous attacks on the El Al and TWA ticket counters in Rome's
Leonardo da Vinci-Fiumicino Airport and on passengers waiting to board a flight
to Tel Aviv at Vienna's Schwechat Airport. It was even reported that the Abu Nidal
attackers were doped on amphetamines, mirroring similar reports about the Mumbai
attackers. The cycle replicates itself because it works and is effective. A terrorist group
will continue to do what is effective and is deemed to be nearly 100% accomplishable.
