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sees concerns of statistical representativeness overshadowed by much thornier nor-
mative questions about the political and ethical legitimacy of deliberation that relies
on appeals to the presence of different groups often without clear sources of authori-
sation from and accountability to those being represented. This not only relates to
existing human actors, but also future generations and nonhuman actors who
present particular 'problems of representing those who cannot speak and have in
that sense no possibility of voice or presence in processes of environmental deci-
sionmaking' (O'Neill, 2001, p. 483). Representation of nonhuman actors in particu-
lar exposes Habermas's 'discursive specialisation' which limits speech acts claiming
to represent the material world to the sphere of science and technology and thereby
'privileg[es] science to speak for nature, and morality to speak for society' (Davies,
2006a, p. 426).
A second, perhaps even more trenchant, critique of participation is that its pro-
ponents have been 'naïve about the complexities of power and power relations'
(Cooke and Kothari, 2001, p. 14). Instead of seeing power as something held in the
hands of a few waiting to be redistributed (as Arnstein and Habermas do), most
critics adopt a Foucauldian approach to understanding power as pervasive and cir-
culating through networks of discourse, practices, and relationships (Foucault,
1980). The very discourse of participation, and not just the institutionalised prac-
tice, embodies the potential to disempower, exclude, conceal oppressions and allow
political co-option (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). Within deliberative processes
Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) argue that Habermasian ideals of com-
municative action cannot control strategic behaviour, nor guarantee participants
will act in an open and honest manner all of the time, due to power inherent within
individuals. Shifting to external power, Stirling (2005) expands on Collingridge's
(1982) discussion of 'decision justifi cation' to highlight how participation can be
used by decision-making institutions as a form either of
weak justifi cation
, avoiding
any future blame through appeals to process effectiveness or
strong justifi cation,
determining particular decision outcomes through manipulation of the framing of
participatory processes to achieve those ends.
A third criticism centres on overly consensual deliberative ideals, found in
Habermasian aspirations for agreement on the 'single best' solution to a problem.
It is questionable whether such consensus is possible or desirable in a world of
increasing uncertainty, pluralism, complexity and social inequality (Pellizzoni,
2003). Furthermore, there is considerable danger that the determination to forge
consensus can hide intractable differences and reinforce hegemonic power relations
by excluding certain voices, framings, and forms of expression (Tewdwr-Jones and
Allmendinger, 1998; Davies, 2006a). In response to these problems, political theo-
rist James Bohman (1996) has reworked Habermas, doing away with the assump-
tion of a unity of rationality and redefi ning successful deliberation in terms of the
continued co-operation of actors rather than a requirement for unanimous agree-
ment. Chantal Mouffe (2000) goes further in arguing that the universal reason of
consensual approaches needs to be replaced with 'agonistic pluralism'. This alterna-
tive theory of public deliberation highlights power relations and exclusions through
confrontation, antagonism, and the exploration of difference.
So, while participatory enthusiasts hold up deliberative processes as a solution
to the defi ciencies of technocratic science-centred approaches, emerging critiques of
participation expose similar problems with representation, exclusion, power, framing
effects, and narrowing down debate. Both technical-analytic
and
deliberative-
