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publicly convincing arguments that appeal to the 'public good' rather than individ-
ual self-interest (Bohman and Rehg, 1997; Mason, 1999; Dryzek, 2002). Jürgen
Habermas (1984; 1987) remains the most authoritative deliberative theorist, most
notably through his works on communicative rationality and the 'ideal speech situ-
ation', a discursive ethics that emphasises the central role of language and undis-
torted communication as the basis for reaching non-coerced mutual understanding
and agreement through the force of the best argument alone. Habermas's commu-
nicative rationality seeks to counter the dominance of instrumental rationality and
formal expertise over lifeworld (cultural) rationality grounded in understandings of
everyday life, an asymmetry that is particularly ingrained in the environmental
sphere.
Over the years a range of arguments have been advanced promoting the virtues
of deliberation and participation. Fiorino (1990) differentiates between normative,
instrumental, and substantive rationales. From a normative (or ethical) viewpoint
participation is simply the right thing to do. Deliberative democratic theories hold
that citizens have a right to infl uence decisions that affect their own lives, based on
principles of citizen empowerment, equity, and social justice (Renn et al., 1995;
Bohman, 1996). Instrumental (or practical) rationales contend that participation is
a better way to achieve particular ends, such as, increasing public trust and the
legitimacy of governing institutions (see Irwin, 2006), enhancing the acceptance and
implementation of environmental policy (Eden, 1996) or reducing confl ict surround-
ing decisions (Renn et al., 1995). Whether such 'benefi ts' are actually realised in
practice is a different matter.
Substantive rationales claim that participation leads to better ends, in both the
quality of environmental science (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993) and environmental
decisions (Coenen et al., 1998). Work in geography, science and technology studies
(STS), and risk research has argued that inclusion of wider non-scientifi c knowl-
edges, values and meanings can lead to environmental science and policy that is of
greater analytical rigour (Stirling, 1998) and social intelligence or robustness (Leach
et al., 2005). Substantive rationales encompass both epistemological arguments for
incorporating other 'ways of knowing' and uncertifi ed forms of expertise (Collins
and Evans, 2002), as well as ontological arguments for acknowledging wider public
meanings and non-scientifi c 'ways of being' with nature, whose dismissal by experts
is often a source of public discontent with science (Wynne, 2005). A further partici-
patory rationale, learning, can be identifi ed as cutting across all three categories
defi ned by Fiorino (Webler et al., 1995).
Such claims about the instrumental and substantive benefi ts of participation are
rarely backed up with evidence of their realisation in practice. As a result some have
characterised participation as an ideology or an 'act of faith' (Cleaver, 2001). The
most obvious operational criticisms of (or 'barriers' to) participation, often aired in
technocratic policy cultures, are that it is unpredictable, causes confl ict and wastes
time and resources (Petts, 2004). Participation is also plagued by a number of practi-
cal problems, including how it relates to expert and representative democratic
systems, widespread 'consultation fatigue', and an increasing fragmentation of effort
(Pellizzoni, 2003).
Beyond these practical problems, there lie three more deep seated critiques, relat-
ing to issues of representation, power, and consensus. First, critics often complain
that the small number of participants typically involved in deliberative processes
are 'unrepresentative' of wider affected populations (Munton, 2003). O'Neill (2001)
