Biomedical Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
Baillie uses this sense of life as a discovery to argue against any posi-
tion that presents life as a plan, something that is “known and recog-
nized,” or at least whose basic capabilities are known and recognized.
For example, John Rawls's suggestion that because of the natural lottery
people can be unfairly disadvantaged, presumes a given collection of
natural abilities, the absence or degradation of which is a problem of
nature that society has an obligation to correct. This position encour-
ages genetic therapy, as well perhaps as genetic engineering, as a likely
extension of this social obligation. Rawlsian limits on this would be due
to other problems of social justice—that is, the equal protection of rights
or a fair distribution of resources—not because of any interference with
human nature.
Baillie argues against this abandonment of the discussion of human
nature in favor of issues of social justice. His hylomorphic view of human
nature does generate adequate content to critique genetic engineering
before later limiting conditions of social justice appear. As a critique, he
claims “the focus of genetic engineering is the body actualized. . . . [I]t
seeks to eliminate the need for a soul by substituting a developed genetic
code for the serendipity of the soul.” Genetic engineering, whether in the
form of therapy or enhancement, seeks to substitute control of the body
for surprise by the soul. This substitution of controlled genetic code for
the soul makes impossible the discovery of the self by taking away the
only means by which the self is discovered: a life in which serendipity
(no matter what the occasion) can occur. It is not that we know the
person and know the effects that genetic engineering will have; it is rather
that genetic engineering will make it impossible to be a person. The sub-
stitution of control for spontaneity is ultimately the basis of his critique
of genetic engineering.
Robert Proctor is a historian of science and technology. His approach
to the question of the future of human nature reflects a historian's pref-
erence: he looks back. Specifically, he looks back at the paleontological
record of human diversity to illustrate the difficulties in arriving at a clear
sense of what is “fully human.” His reflection on this record leads to
several observations. Humanness is a recent phenomenon (dating back
between 150,000 and 50,000 years), and in general the attribution of
humanness is a bit faddish—or at least influenced by the concerns of the
times. For the purposes of his discussion, Proctor equates humanness
