Biomedical Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
cusing of the discussion of genetics as engineering—that is, of the possi-
bilities of technology and control—to an examination of the metaphys-
ical roots of personhood.
He argues that two traditional understandings of the person cast no
light directly on the ethics of genetic science. Descartes' dualism, as in
the second and sixth of his
Meditations on First Philosophy
, fails to be
useful in addressing genetics because it suggests that the soul, or res cog-
itans, exists utterly independently of the body. Thus, modifications of the
body (for example, the improvements in the health of the body called
for in the
Discourse on Method
) can improve the situation of the soul,
even its wisdom, without altering its nature. Second, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau's sense of freedom as the ability to imitate and change leaves
open the questions of limits to that change. Fundamental to Rousseau's
position is the suggestion that we have already significantly altered our
nature simply by joining society, so there is no inherent objection to
further changes. Freedom does not in principle suffer from genetic engi-
neering, nor does it offer any guidance to a discussion of the appropri-
ateness of genetic change in general or specific forms of it.
Baillie then attempts a more positive discussion of the issue by turning
to Aristotle's hylomorphism. Like Tom Shannon's effort in this volume
at ressourcement, Baillie suggests that a rereading of hylomorphism may
help in the discussion of embodiment and the impact that genetic engi-
neering can have on the person. He identifies
person
with the actuality
of a body with organs, a “possession” of the body by its own being. This
actuality is both the cause of the unity of the parts of the body and
the result of this unity. As such, the position avoids the freedom-
materialism distinction, or the soul/body distinction, by seeing the rela-
tionship as a vertical one of potentiality and actuality. What the person
is, is identified by what the person consists of, and what the person does
with that what. This is the ground for Baillie's distinction between
freedom and serendipity. Freedom tends to be understood as unidirec-
tional. Rousseau, for example, orients freedom to the possibilities opened
by imitation, and neglects the material source of those possibilities. In
contrast, serendipity is the response of the person to his or her embodi-
ment, a response made possible by the body itself. Thus, the person goes
beyond the body by making more of the body than it is. The life activ-
ity of a body always comes as a surprise, in essence, a discovery.
