The Scramble for Cambodia - Hun Sen's Cambodia - page 174

away to Thai and Malaysian logging firms and keeping taxes low to maximize the in-
formal profits that flowed back their way. Logging cash was spread around to maintain
the loyalty of the military, fund the civil war, and grease the wheels of patronage. The
feedback between logging and conflict formed a particularly destructive cycle: as Global
Witness observed, logging was used to fund military campaigns, which were then used as
a pretext for more logging. 11 This free-for-all took place beyond the reach of any compet-
ent authority. Mok Mareth, a secretary of state in the Ministry of Environment, admitted
in 1994 that his department was “powerless” to act. “The situation is really very delicate.
My officers cannot get to the remote rural areas and can only speculate as to what is really
going on,” he told the Phnom Penh Post . 12
For Cambodia's international backers, the forestry sector would emerge as a key test
of reform and “good governance” initiatives. Development consultants then saw timber
as the country's most valuable natural resource, and pressed the government to reform its
forestry management system. But Cambodian political leaders relied heavily on logging
as a source of patronage, and zigzagged around donor recommendations. Between 1992
and 1996, log export bans were declared on five separate occasions, but within weeks or
months they were lifted on various pretexts and it was back to business as usual. 13
By the time the Khmer Rouge imploded in the late 1990s, the Cambodian government
had quietly granted between 30 and 40 logging concessions to local and foreign-owned
companies, covering 7 million hectares of forest—around 39 percent of the country's land
area. 14 Only a fraction of the profit was reaching the state's coffers. In 1998 a forestry
report funded by the World Bank estimated that as much as 95 percent of the past year's
timber production had taken place off the topics. 15 By another estimate the state was los-
ing around $100 million per year in duties and taxes. 16 Donors started to lose patience. In
1996 the International Monetary Fund froze a $20 million tranche of funds in response to
the gross mismanagement of forestry revenues. The World Bank withheld $15 million. 17
At the Tokyo aid summit in February 1999, forestry issues topped the agenda. The out-
come was the creation of a Forest Crimes Monitoring Unit to help build the government's
“capacity” to fight illegal logging, and Global Witness was appointed as an independent
forestry monitor. To placate the aid-givers, Cambodian officials conjured up their mirage.
They passed a new Forestry Law requiring logging concessionaires to produce sustainab-
ility and environmental impact plans, and Hun Sen vowed clampdowns on those breaking
the rules. “If I don't take away your concessions and close down your factory I will cut
my throat,” he said in December 2001. 18 Shortly afterward the government announced
moratoria on the harvesting and transportation of logs. Noncompliant concessions were
cancelled, and the concession system was eventually abandoned altogether.
It looked a lot like real change. But as with the LMAP land titling program (see Chapter
8), hope and reality soon parted ways. The truth was that Hun Sen probably couldn't have